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Abstract: Understanding the determinants that shape public opinion and policy preference 
requires a thoughtful examination of social identity. In the United States, religion has not only 
been a power force for group formation, but has had a consistent impact on individual opinion. 
To explore the role of social identity on public opinion, I primarily examine the policy 
preferences of Evangelicals. First, I examine whether Evangelicals and gun owners are more 
punitive and aggressive in their attitudes towards the death penalty and the use of military force 
against militant Muslim groups. Second, I explore if Evangelicals perceive discrimination 
against Christians, their support for the religious rights frame, and policy preferences for out-
groups. Finally, using the policy diffusion framework, I examine whether or not the number of 
Evangelicals affects the passage of Religious Freedom Restoration Acts across the states. My 
findings suggest that social identity does impact public opinion and policy preference. 





















 I am grateful for the support of my committee members, friends, and family as I have 
worked to complete this dissertation. Many individuals helped me to experience substantial 
growth while in graduate school. 
 I would like to express my sincere appreciation for Donald Haider-Markel for mentoring 
and advising me through this process. Thank you for believing in me. You had a lot to teach me 
and help me through in a relatively short amount of time. I am grateful for your care for me and 
my growing family. 
 I would like to thank Mark Joslyn for his support, especially while I was on the job 
market. I am grateful to Patrick Miller for always telling me how it is and providing his students 
with practical as well as academic skills. I owe Christina Bejarano for being the first professor I 
was a GTA for, for her encouragement, and copy editing. I would also like to thank Ludwin 
Molina for bringing a social psychology perspective to my committee and being willing to help 
me meet my deadlines. 
 I owe a big debt of gratitude to Matthew Miles, my undergraduate advisor, for noticing 
potential in me. Despite having many students and classes to teach, Matt took the time to guide 
me to graduate school and kept in touch throughout my studies. Thank you. 
 Graduate school; is a place for mutual support and friendship. I appreciate Andrew Bilbo, 
Michael Baggs, Ben Rogers, Steve Sylvester, Patrick Gauding, Alex Middlewood, Rachael 
Finnell, and all my other colleagues and friends. 
 Lastly, I could not have done this without the support of my wife and Children. Thank 





Table of Contents 
Chapter 1 ............................................................................................................... 1 
Chapter 2 ............................................................................................................. 15 
Chapter 3 ............................................................................................................. 37 
Chapter 4 ............................................................................................................. 64 




Is the United States’ Religious Past Framing its Future1? 
Introduction 
There is a connection between politics and religion in the United States. One foreign 
observer remarked that the United States had the “soul of a church” (Chesterton 1922). Today 
surveys indicate that anywhere between half and two thirds of adults in America are affiliated 
with either a church, or denomination (Kosmin and Keysar 2006, 24; Winseman 2005). Of 
course, there are pros and cons to the role religion can play in public life, including polit ics.   
Moreover, in a democracy where we expect the rights of groups to the protected, where is 
the line between protecting religious liberty and preventing religion-based discrimination? The 
founders saw fit to include in the first amendment to the Constitution, a protection of the free 
exercise of religion, and yet, simultaneously forbade the establishment of a state-run church. 
Ideally, these provisions of the Constitution were inserted to protect religious minorities from a 
tyrannical religious majority. Ironically, in the twenty-first century, religious liberty is in conflict 
with minority rights. Even at the founding, Americans have struggled to maintain a balance 
between religious good and bad.  
A current example is manifest in the Supreme Court case, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission. The case involves a baker, Jack C. Phillips, who refused to 
make a wedding cake for a gay couple. Phillips’s attorney argued that forcing him to make a 
cake undermines Phillips religious liberty. The cake represents an art form that Mr. Phillips 
cannot, in good conscious, provide for a ceremony which he understands to be against God’s 
commandments. David Mullins and Charlie Craig, the couple, were humiliated and deeply hurt 
                                                             
1 Historian Mark Noll said that America’s religious past frames its future (Noll 2003). 
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by the refusal. However, the bigger problem is that by siding with Mr. Phillips, the court might 
undue years of civil rights progress (Liptak 2017). 
This court case provides a clear example of how the policy interest and behaviors of an 
individual or religious organization can have enormous effects on policy decisions, laws, and the 
lives of Americans. Debate over the conflict of protecting both religious liberty and civil rights is 
only one example of the role that religion is destined to play in the coming years. As such, 
researchers should take greater time to investigate the role of religion in American politics.   
Historic Role 
It is difficult to distinguish the exact role of religion in American society. The ambiguity 
breeds conflict between opposing visions. Some argue that religion is the most fundamental 
liberty enshrined in the Constitution (Gunn and Witte 2012). Not only is it an important right, but 
as the argument goes, one so venerated, that it appears in the first amendment to the Bill of 
Rights. Another vision comes from a completely contrasting understanding. Some fear the role 
of religion in society (Blogowska and Saroglou 2011; Pichon and Saroglou 2009). Likewise, the 
founders insisted on the separation of church and state (see Jefferson’s Virginia Statute of 
Religious Freedom). The founders were familiar with battles between Catholics and Protestants 
in Europe as well as struggle that the colonies had with the Church of England (Fowler et al. 
2010). Conflicts between conceptualizations of the role of religion continued to influence politics 
in America. 
Some political scientists argue that the separation of church and state has led to increased 
religious pluralism (Fowler et al. 2010). Since there was no state religion, people have been left 
free to explore different options and find what works best for them. Options came from both 
religious entrepreneurs (Marty 1985) and immigrants (Eck 2001) who created what has become 
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known as the religious marketplace (Ruthven 1989). The free market place of religious thought 
generated a lot of religious excitement in the nineteenth century (Noll and Harlow 2007).  
Even with the United States’ history of religious freedom and pluralism, religious 
persecution still found its way into the nation. Protestantism had a large influence on early U.S. 
society and feared the rise of other religious movements. This point can be best illustrated by the 
rise of a U.S. based religious movement in the early nineteenth century. The Church of Jesus 
Christ of Latter-day Saints (LDS), often referred to as Mormons, trace their founding back to a 
vision given to their first leader, Joseph Smith. Smith claimed to have seen God and Jesus Christ 
in a grove near his childhood home at the age of fourteen. He claimed further revelation from an 
angel who told Smith about golden plates recording the religious history of the Ancient 
Americas. Smith claimed to translate this record into the Book of Mormon (Ahlstrom 1972, 501-
509). 
The LDS church was met with instant religious persecution which, in part, was due to its 
theologically different approach to Christianity (Givens 2013). The early Mormon church 
practiced polygamy, brought new immigrants to join their movement from Europe, and created 
communities that rivaled those around them in size and political power (Taylor and Arrington 
1958). Mobs chased the Mormons from state to state, and eventually killed the Mormon Prophet 
Joseph Smith. Brigham Young, the second Mormon religious leader moved his people across the 
plains to Utah, where they would continue to face pressures to change from the U.S. government 
(Ahlstrom 1972, 501-509; Fowler et al 2010, 7-8). 
The LDS movement was not the only example of religious persecution in the United 
States. The nineteenth century also saw the growth of the Catholic population in the United 
States. Waves of immigrants from Catholic countries such as Ireland, Italy, and Poland led to 
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sharp contention between Catholics and Protestants (Layman 2001). Fights over education policy 
epitomize this conflict. Protestants fought hard against state funding for Catholic schools 
(Mahoney 2003). This split significantly shaped American political history, in part, through the 
development of a religious partisan divide. Within the Republican and Democratic parties today 
we still see lingering effects from the nineteenth century division (Layman 1997).        
Then as now, the concept of religious freedom meant different things depending on who 
you talked to. In the twenty-first century Christians in the U.S. are in greater harmony with each 
other, at least compared to the past. Yet, the allusive meaning of religious freedom still conjures 
up conflict between the Christians and other minority groups. For instance, studies show that the 
public has low opinions of Muslims (Penning 2009). In fact, evidence from a national survey 
showed that 33.5 percent of Americans would disapprove of a child wanting to marry a Muslim 
(Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006).  
However, cultural conflict does not just exist between religious believers. In the same 
study, Americans disapproved more of a child wanting to marry an atheist (47.6 percent) than a 
Muslim (Edgell, Gerteis, and Hartmann 2006). Negative public opinion can act as a barrier for 
political activity. For instance, more Americans have indicated that they would refuse to elect a 
well-qualified atheist for President than any other group (Jones 2007). These studies show the 
social and political impacts that can arise from not being religious.  
It is important to note that these current struggles are situated in a context informed by 
more recent history. This context centers on social and cultural revolution. In 1957, Gallup 
pollsters found that 69 percent of Americans felt that “religion is increasing its influence on 
American life” (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 90). In the sixties, a cultural shift took place, 
including the questioning of historic Judeo-Christian theism (Ahlstrom 1972). This can be seen 
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in the development of “the Pill”, Vatican II, the protests surrounding the Vietnam War, the rise 
in drug use, and even many of the movements such as the women’s liberation movement, and the 
environmental and gay rights movements (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 91).  
Perhaps, the most significant changes occurred in the wake of the sexual revolution. 
Putnam and Campbell (2010, 92-93) claim that in 1969, 24 percent of Americans believed that 
premarital sex was “not wrong”. In 1973, this number increased to 47 percent and has continued 
to increase over time. Then, amid these social and cultural changes, the Supreme Court decided 
in the 1973 case, Roe v. Wade, that the Constitution protected the right to privacy. The decision 
to protect a woman’s right to choose whether or not to have an abortion has led to the greatest 
cultural battle in recent history (see Roh and Haider-Markel 2003; Minkenberg 2002; Mooney 
and Lee 1995).   
In response to changes in the sixties, what has been coined as an aftershock, led to the 
formation of religious conservativism as seen today (Putnam and Campbell 2010, 91-133). As 
stated above, religious groups have historically aligned with political parties to exercise their 
political will. Yet in the 1970s and 1980s this took a new turn. Those who were conservative in 
both politics and religion started to join with Evangelical Protestant denominations. The religious 
right began fighting against abortion, drugs, pornography, and other policies they felt were 
cultural ills (see Meier 1994; Morone 2003). 
The pendulum swung again in the 1990s and 2000s. Political scientists found that 
American voters were increasingly alarmed by the role religious organizations were playing in 
politics (Bolce and De Maio 1999). The percent of Americans who felt that religious leaders 
were too influential in their congregation’s political decisions increased from 22 percent in 2001 
to 34 percent in 2008 (Chaves 2011). Terms like the “Religious Right” and “Christian Right” 
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captured this union between conservatives in religion and politics. Evangelical Protestants role in 
politics epitomize this merger.     
The United States has a unique history, which in part, has to do with the decision of the 
founders to enshrine into the Constitution a separation between church and state. We have seen 
how this has led to religious pluralism, which in turn, has fostered conflict between religious 
organizations. The emergence of the Religious Right in the seventies and eighties created 
religious and political conflict between conservatives and the rest of society. In the twenty-first 
century, we continue to see conflict between religious movements and minority groups.  
Research has yet to fully address state Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs) as a 
major realm of conflict between religious freedom and anti-discrimination. The line between the 
two has brought increased tension between the Religious Right and the LGBT rights movement.  
Contemporary Conflict: Religious Freedom and LGBT Discrimination 
Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) individuals likewise face 
discrimination in the name of religious liberty. Several states have received a lot of attention 
from politicians, the media, special interests, and even celebrities for proposing state Religious 
Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs). RFRAs have been framed as needed protection for religious 
expression by some interest groups and religious organizations. Others are afraid that state 
RFRAs will lead to the legalization of discrimination (see Hamilton 1998). Yet these state policy 
battles are not the first attempt by religious organizations to guarantee greater protection to 
religious liberty. 
In the early 1990s, frustration with the Supreme Court’s rulings on the Free Exercise 
Clause came to a breaking point over a decision about religious practices (see Hamilton 1998). 
The decision reached in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
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Smith was particularly frustrating to these religious organizations. The Court found that the state 
of Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to an individual for smoking peyote (Employment 
Div. v. Smith 1990). Oregon prohibited the use of peyote but Smith argued that this violated his 
first amendment right because the peyote was part of a religious ritual.  
In response to this decision, a coalition of churches petitioned Congress for added 
protection for religious exercise (see Laylock 1993). Pro-life groups such as the National 
Association of Evangelicals, the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, 
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, U.S. Catholic Conference, and the Home School 
Legal Defense Fund2 were some of the most ardent supporters for congressional interference. In 
1993, Congress gave these groups what they wanted by passing the federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act. The act put greater responsibility on the government to show that a law did not 
target religious expression. RFRA protected religious liberty unless government could show a 
compelling interest but, the government still had to use the least restrictive means to serve its 
interest (RFRA 1993, 103d). Soon thereafter, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, Patrick 
Flores, brought suit against the City of Boerne for refusing his petition to expand his church. City 
of Boerne officials cited its historic preservation law, noting that the church was in a historic 
district and was a contributing property (City of Boerne v Flores 1997). 
The case was shepherded through the court system by the religious coalition that 
promoted the passage of RFRA. They would be disappointed once again by the Supreme Court’s 
decision. Not only did the Court rule in favor of the City of Boerne but ruled RFRA to be 
                                                             
2  (See, e.g., The Religous Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (Restoring Religious Liberty in America: An Analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act by Coalitions for America) (full text on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1992) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Robert Dugan, Jr., Director, 
Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals); id. at 23 (statement of Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Quorum 
of the Twelve Apostles, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). 
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unconstitutional in the process (City of Boerne v Flores 1997, 2172). Before the Boerne decision 
only two states, Connecticut and Rhode Island had adopted RFRAs of their own. Since 1998, 
nineteen other states have adopted a RFRA (Johnson and Steinmetz 2015).  .  
 At the same time, several cities and states have non-discrimination ordinances that 
protected minorities from prejudice from small business owners (Riccucci and Gossett 1996). 
Currently, the Supreme Court is hearing a case where a baker was sued by the state of Colorado 
for refusing to customize an order for a gay couple. This is certainly not the first case of its kind 
to be heard by the courts. Once again, the question arises: what exactly is the role of religion and 
religious freedom in the United States? All freedoms are limited to some degree. Religious 
liberty is no different. Where society should allow that line to be drawn, is a debate for the 
coming years.   
Research Design 
 Broadly, this dissertation will focus on the role of religion in American Politics. Chapter 
Two will lay a foundation to this work by showing that religious identity is associated with 
policy preferences. To do this, I will focus on the distinct policy preferences of Evangelical 
Christians. It will be shown that Evangelical policy preferences become more distinct when 
individuals identify with multiple groups that share policy preferences. In this case, I will be 
using gun ownership as a second social identity. I theorize that the added support is due to social 
reinforcement and psychological homogeneity.  
I propose investigating opinions on the use of military force in conflicts in the Middle 
East and on the death penalty. These two policy areas are ideal because research is split on the 
impact religion has in each of them. Putnam and Campbell (2010, 386) find that religiosity 
matters on attitudes about abortion and gay marriage, but less so on matters of foreign policy. 
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They find no support that religiosity effects opinion on the death penalty. This study, however, 
did not break religious denominations into religious traditions, thereby cloaking differences 
between Evangelical Protestants and other traditions.  
 Chapter two relies on survey data to investigate the combined role of religion and gun 
ownership. The 2016 American National Election Survey (ANES) asks respondents whether they 
have a gun in their home. They follow up by asking whether the gun belongs to the respondent or 
someone else. I will use this in combination with questions on religious affiliation as my 
independent variable. The ANES asks respondents, “What is your present religion, if any?” My 
dependent variable will be support for military force and the death penalty. ANES asks if the 
respondent “favors, opposes, or neither favor nor oppose the death penalty for persons convicted 
of murder?” I expect to find that Evangelical Protestants who own guns will be more likely to 
support the use of violence, military force, or harsh penalties, to address problems or infractions.   
 Chapter three seeks to address the question: What is meant by religious freedom? In the 
1990s, religious groups banded together to oppose a series of Supreme court decisions that they 
felt harmed the right to free exercise of religion (Laylock 1993). Since then, Evangelicals have 
only increased their support for federal and state legislation to affirm the right to religious 
freedom. I will use data from the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) to show that 
Evangelicals are particularly supportive of the fight for religious freedom. I will also address 
which policies they believe fall under the protection of religious freedom.  
I will conclude by theorizing what is meant by religious freedom. The French observer, 
Alexis de Tocqueville, notes the influence of the United States’ Puritan heritage when addressing 
early America’s conceptualization of freedom. Freedom did not necessitate allowing individuals 
to do whatsoever they pleased, rather, provided the opportunity for individuals to do that which 
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was good and right (Mansfield and Winthrop 2000). This insight to American religious culture 
could provide insight into what is meant by religious liberty and freedom by the Religious Right.  
In chapter four, I will be addressing American politics and policy from a higher-level. I 
will address the question: what effects do religious groups and public opinion has on policy 
adoption? Specifically, I will employ the theory of policy diffusion to understand why some 
states adopt Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs), while others do not. I gather state 
level data to test the hypothesis that religion plays a role in RFRA adoption. The dependent 
variable will be whether a state adopted a RFRA. Independent variables include: religiosity, 
citizen ideology, legislative ideology, governor’s ideology, and evangelical population.  
 I expect to find that the presence of Evangelical Protestants will increase the likelihood of 
RFRA adoption. I believe their effect will be independent of other measures like diffusion 
effects, ideology, and religiosity. Future work will be needed to clarify whether such bills are the 
result of a conservative rights pushback or not. It will make it clear that religious groups 
mobilize and venue shop to get their preferred policies passed. 
 Chapter five concludes the study by addressing the implication of my research for the 
study of religion and U.S. politics. A pattern emerges that religious freedom allows groups to use 
politics and policy to oppose behavior that is not congruent with their faith. Likewise, politics 
and policy are used to impose harsh penalties that force conformity. The United States is 
institutionally designed to allow religious freedom and to prevent centralized discrimination by 
religious groups. Future research is needed to ascertain if these two goals are still in balance in 
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Support for the Death Penalty and Military Intervention: How Identity 
Effects Policy 
Introduction 
Since the 2016 election of Donald Trump, increased attention has been given to 
individual and group identity in America. Research into how different social groups perceive 
threat and discrimination, and the types of policy preferences that are garnering more support are 
but two examples of areas where new research is needed.  
The 2016 election, and the rise of Donald Trump in the Republican presidential 
nomination process, illustrated the key role played by Evangelicals and gun owners in recent 
elections (Fea 2018). In this chapter, I will focus on these categories as social identities and 
assessing whether gun ownership and identifying as Evangelical is associated with more punitive 
and aggressive policy preferences.  To do so, I will be analyzing attitudes about the death penalty 
and the use of military intervention in Iraq and Syria against militant groups like ISIS.  
I employ Social Identity Theory to understand why these groups might be more likely to 
take punitive policy or aggressive stances on these issues. In so doing, I also expand on work 
done by scholars of religion and politics into religious identity and policy preference (see Jelen 
1993; Penning 2009; and Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege 1993). Social identity theory posits that 
groups become more discriminatory against out-groups in the face of negative esteem (Turner 
and Reynold 2008). Both groups, gun owners and Evangelicals, have reasons to believe that they 
are held in negative esteem by society (Hout and Fischer 2002; Kleck 1996; Patrick 2013). They 
also have a common disdain for those on death row and militant Muslims (Penning 2009).  In 
each of the cases presented my hypothesis is that gun owners and Evangelicals will display an 
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increase likelihood of supporting the proposed policy.  
My results suggest that gun owners are more likely to support the death penalty but not 
military intervention. Evangelicals were not statistically more likely to support either policy. 
This result found in this chapter on the attitudes of Evangelicals is not completely surprising. 
Recent work indicates that religious identity alone will not influence most policies, except when 
paired with another identity to activate its effects (Campbell et al. 2016). To test this theory, a 
measure interacting gun owning Evangelicals was modeled. Evidence suggests that gun owning 
Evangelicals are more likely to support military intervention.  To conclude, I offer suggestions 
for additional research.      
Social Identity 
 
Social identities theory has two branches: social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979) 
and self-categorization theory (Turner et al. 1987). The initial focus, (or first branch) known 
simply as social identities theory, was on the psychological desire to support or disavow an 
existing social group. Social identity is the part of our self-conceptualization that is made up of 
the groups to which we belong (Cottam et al. 2016). Research following this vein often 
distinguishes groups by a common label (see Huddy 2001, 132-133; Diehl 1990). Social identity 
theory explores the behavior derived from the desire to have one’s groups be viewed in a positive 
light in comparison to others (Tajfel 1981; Tajfel and Tuner 1979; Turner et al. 1987).  
Another major component was the focus on how individuals dealt with their identity 
problems (Tajfel 1978). Tajfel (1978) outlined four basic responses to dealing with a negative 
social identity that could be performed by an individual or social group. First, one could leave 
the group to which they were associating. Second, social groups could shift from a negative 
image to a positive one by using a different dimension of comparison. Since social identity 
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theory posits that the goal is a positive image in comparison to other social groups, changing the 
evaluation criteria might help to change the outcome of the current comparison. Third, Social 
groups or individuals might reframe the comparison criteria to make it more negative or positive 
to suit their needs. Finally, the group could alter the group they are being compared with to a 
lower status group (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979).  
The second branch built on this work by suggesting that there are degrees to which 
people typify the prototypical group member (Lakoff 1999; Turner et al. 1987, 42). Therefore, 
motivational factors become key in understanding the degree to which members have adopted 
the group identity. This differs from social identity theory by adding a separate dimension. The 
original assumption of social identity theory was that individuals associated with a group would 
internalize the label as a social identity (Huddy 2001, 133) and did not initially expand on 
degrees of identity. From these branches of social identity theory, it can be understood that 
motivational factors are necessary when researching intergroup discrimination or understanding 
degrees of hatred for outside groups, while mere categorization is sufficient to explain the 
creation of a social identity (Huddy 2001).  
Two notes about this research is important to mention before moving on to specific 
identities. Often in this research, motivational factors are derived from theory, not data (Djupe 
and Calfano 2014, pg. 35; Djupe and Hunt 2009; Turner and Reynolds 2008, pg. 141). Although 
not ideal, such work is necessary in driving new avenues for research that can incorporate data to 
better explain motivational factors. Second, knowledge of self-categorization theory is necessary 
because it often becomes conflated with social identity theory leading to erroneous claims never 
intended by the original developers of the theory (Turner and Reynolds 2008, pg. 134). 
There are three major theoretical frameworks used to investigate religious influence on 
18 
 
public opinion and behavior (for discussion see Djupe and Calfano 2014). They are the religious 
commitment approach, social networks approach, and psychological approaches. This chapter 
relies on social identity theory which fits under psychological approaches. Djupe and Calfano 
(2014) state that psychological approaches, like identity theory, are “the least organized and 
potentially widest-ranging approach to studying religious influence…” (pg. 31). One reason 
social identity theory has not been fully utilized by these scholars is because of its reliance on 
logic versus data (Djupe and Calfano 2014, 35; Wilcox, Jelen, and Leege 1993). This is an 
oversight. Insofar as social identity theory can call attention to new research questions, 
methodological development, such as an increase in reliance on survey experiments, can be used.  
Before abandoning the other frameworks that religion scholars rely on, an important 
distinction needs to be made. The religious commitment approach centers on what is commonly 
called the “3Bs”. The “3Bs” stand for belonging, belief and behavior, which are usually regarded 
as co-equal indicators of commitment. Therefore, researchers taking this approach need to 
capture all three measures. This is important because social identity research focuses solely on 
religious tradition as an indicator of group identity. Early research focused on identifying the 
religious affiliation of respondents. This is difficult, because people provide generic labels for 
their faith with “no further specifics” (NFSes). For example, the Orthodox Presbyterian Church 
differs on doctrine and policy from the Presbyterian Church in America, but they are both 
considered Presbyterian despite these differences (Mead and Hill 1995). One proposed solution 
was to aggregate denominations into “religious traditions” (Kellstedt et al. 1996). The most 
common typology used for grouping religious traditions is Mainline Protestants, Evangelical 
Protestant, Orthodox, Black Protestant, Jewish, Catholic, and unconventional Christian (see 
Steensland et al. 2000). 
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In the social sciences, many have taken a simpler “self-identification scheme” by asking 
respondents if they consider themselves to be born-again or Evangelical (see Burge and Lewis 
2018). Burge and Lewis (2018) used several waves of the General Social Survey and the 
Cooperative Congressional Election Study to compare the two approaches. They found almost 
no statistical differences between the two measurements and concluded that either would suffice 
in capturing religious social identity.   
An example of research using the social identities approach in religious studies is 
Penning’s (2009) study of American attitudes towards Muslims and Mormons. Since the attack 
on the World Trade Centers, Muslims have been categorized as outsiders. Penning (2009) found 
that when asked to evaluate “American Muslims” instead of Muslims, favorability ratings go up 
ten points. Other religious traditions that have been examined include: evangelical, 
fundamentalist, charismatic, liberal, and conservative Christians (See Jelen 1993; Wilcox, Jelen, 
and Leege 1993). 
Despite these arguments for the importance of the impact of religious social identity on 
attitudes, there is still skepticism about what role religion plays (see Campbell et al 2016, 236). 
An emerging hypothesis, the indirect effect hypothesis, provides a new way of conceptualizing 
the effects of religion. The indirect effect hypothesis, as the name suggests, predicts that religion 
matters, but is often one step removed (Campbell et al 2016, 237-238). Under this theory, 
religion still has direct effects on some attitudes and positions, like abortion. However, on other 
issues, religion plays an indirect role through party affiliation.  
Data shows the connection between party and religion in the minds of the public. When 
compared to Democrats, Americans say that the Republican Party is friendly to religion (Pew 
2014). Furthermore, when asked to list groups associated with each party, voters indicated 
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religion groups in association with the Republicans. In fact, religious groups came second only to 
conservatives, which most of the public views as synonymous with the Republican Party 
(Campbell, Green, and Layman 2016). However, no one has examined whether other identities 
can be used to activate religious attitudes. Gun ownership is one such identity that might lead to 
the activation of religious opinions. 
Gun ownership as a social identity has been examined less than religious identity. In a 
recent study, gun ownership was shown to have a significant electoral impact (Joslyn et al 2017). 
Joslyn and his colleagues (2017) point to a high proportion of gun owners in America, the 
salience of guns in social and political culture, the power of the gun lobbies, and a growing 
divide between gun owners and non-owners for this impact. They suggest that gun ownership is 
a political identity that rivals other social groups.     
This correlates with work done by sociologists, which suggests, that gun owners share in 
a unique culture. For example, citizens who are concerned about defending their civil liberties 
from the government rely on the second amendment as a lifeline (Halbrook 2013). In their 
minds, gun ownership acts as a leveling effect against government power. Gun owners view 
themselves as “freedom fighters” that are defending individual rights (Melzer 2009). Gun culture 
views the gun owner as a model of personal responsibility (Halbrook 2013). This sense of culture 
adds to the notion that gun owners can be seen as a separate identity group. 
Policy Attitudes 
 
 We have established that social groups help individuals establish their identity (Tajfel and 
Turner 1979). Also, social identity theory has been used to show that groups do in fact 
discriminate against out-groups, particularly in the face of a negative social image (Turner and 
Reynolds 2008, pg. 142). It is understandable that Evangelicals and gun owners feel 
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discriminated against. Evangelicals have arguably seen a decline in positive esteem over the 
decades (Putnam and Campbell 2012). This, in part, is the result of increased secularization 
(Hout and Fischer 2002).  Not only have Evangelicals received pressure from society, gun 
owners, arguably, have received even greater pressure over the years (Kleck 1996). This is due to 
increase mass shooting, negative views of the NRA, and, consistent pressure from gun control 
lobbies to restrict access (Patrick 2013). If both social groups do face low amounts of positive 
social image, this could affect how they perceive policy.  
Death Penalty 
 
Public opinion always matters in a democracy. This is clear when looking at the history 
of the death penalty in America. Compared to other policy areas, the public has relatively firm 
positions when it comes to the death penalty (see Baumgartner, De Boef, and Boydstun 2008, 
166-198). Of even more significance, Baumgartner and his colleagues (2008) show that the 
Supreme Court takes public opinion into consideration when making rulings. Every decision 
made by the Court in the last century has cited polls conducted by Gallup or other major survey 
organizations. The American public by and large supports the death penalty. However, frames 
surrounding the issue do matter. Since the advent of DNA testing and the rise of the innocence 
frame, opinion has slowly declined (Baumgartner, De Boef, Boydstun 2008, 227-230). 
A great deal of attention has been paid to distinguish which groups in society support the 
death penalty. Of course, race has a huge role in opinion about the death penalty (Halim and 
Stiles 2001; Young 1991, 1992). Other demographic and political factors have also been shown 
to have significant impact. Ellsworth and Goss (1994) find that men, those with higher income, 
whites, Republicans, conservatives, members of the middle class, and those with lower levels of 
education tend to be more supportive of the death penalty. Others have examined the role of the 
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local environment. Studies find that families living in areas with high murder rates are more 
supportive of the death penalty (Soss et al. 2003; Taylor et al. 1979).  
Of particular importance to this study, religion has been shown to effect attitudes about 
the death penalty (Grasmick and McGill 1994; Grasmick et al. 1992). Scholars have found a 
significant tie between Evangelical Protestants and support for the death penalty. Grasmick and 
his colleagues (1993) find that Evangelicals are more inclined to attribute crime to offenders' 
dispositional characteristics than to situational factors. Consequently, they are expected to be 
more punitive than members of other groups.  
The role of religion has also been seen since the Supreme Court’s 1976 ruling in Gregg v. 
Georgia. The Court declared that the public's desire for retribution can be a legitimate basis for 
penal policy. The mix between retributive doctrines and opinions about the death penalty is 
closely linked to affiliation with fundamentalist Protestant denominations and fundamentalist 
religious beliefs (Grasmick et al. 1992). This makes sense from a social identity perspective 
because those on death row can easily be viewed as the most sinful. Thus, those perceived as 
such great sinners might be among the out-groups that Evangelicals compare themselves to. 
It has been shown that part of gun culture is founded on self-defense (Halbrook 2013). 
Therefore, it makes sense for gun owners to view those sentenced to death as a possible group to 
which they would have particular malice. Most individuals sentenced to death have committed 
crimes like murder, one of the very things that gun owners want to protect society from.  
Military Force  
 
Public opposition to the Vietnam War influenced early research on U.S. public support 
for the use of military force. Mueller (1971) found that opposition to Vietnam increased with the 
number of casualties. The role that casualties play on support for military force has been 
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consistent over time and conflicts (Gartner 2008). Other findings suggest that the public likes 
victories (Eichenberg 2005), success (Gelpi, Feaver, and Reifler 2009), and multilateralism 
(Chaudoin, Milner, and Tingley 2010). On the other hand, the public does not like 
inconsistencies (Tomz 2007) and high risk. These results reinforce the belief that the public acts 
predictably and cautiously to world events (Jentleson 1992; Kertzer 2013; Page and Shapiro 
1992). In fact, some researchers suggest that the public’s foreign policy orientations are stable 
and well-structured (Herrmann, Tetlock, and Visser 1999; Holsti 1979; Rathbun 2007; Wittkopf 
1990). One reason for this could be that opinions are rooted in core values (Goren et al. 2016; 
Rathbun et al. 2016). 
Research indicates that religion plays a role in support for military force. A study on 
Latinos in the U.S. finds that those who confirm that their religious beliefs are important to them 
are more likely to support military action (Leal 2005). A 1930s study found that Catholic and 
Lutheran undergraduates at the University of Chicago were the most militaristic of the religious 
groups (Droba 1950). Wald (1992) hypothesizes that a combination of creedal, communal and 
institutional forces, generate strong Catholic support for American military action. A more recent 
study conducted by Brown, Brown and Blase (2013), suggests that religious faith plays a role in 
the degree to which political discussions had within worship spaces associates with anti-war 
attitudes. However, they find that white Evangelical Protestants tend to be less opposed to 
aggressive military policy than others. These differences become more pronounced as members 
of these religious faiths become involved in and/or exposed to social-political discussions within 
worship spaces.  
According to social identity theory, military aggression should be supported most by 
Evangelicals if against a perceived outgroup (Tuner and Reynolds 2008). Some Americans view 
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Muslims as religious enemies (Cimino 2005; Smidt 2005). Muslims have been categorized by 
Americans as outsider since September 11, 2001 (Penning 2009). Although some evidence 
suggests that a reframing, such as “American Muslim”, marginally increases favorability ratings 
(Penning 2009). Opinion of militant Muslims abroad is going to be even worse. Some evidence 
is provided by Jacobson (2005) who found that “religious conservatives” accepted Bush’s 
justifications for war with Iraq than did other citizens (also see Guth 2004). There are some 
reasons why Evangelicals might consider militant Muslims, ISIS for example, as a relevant out-
group. For instance, some scholars suggest that President George W. Bush’s foreign policy 
decisions were substantially influenced by an “evangelical mind-set”: militarism, nationalistic 
assertiveness, and an apocalyptic attachment to Israel (Marsden 2008). An attachment to Israel 
would certainly drive Evangelicals to view militant Muslims as a relevant out-group. 
Evangelicals have also been shown to be influenced by a belief in Manifest Destiny or special 
providence (McCartney 2004; Judis 2005), which could have unique undertones when applied to 
the Middle East. 
The perceived difference in value systems has historically caused contention between 
Islam and Christianity. It has been said that Communism may have been replaced by militant 
Islam as the major competition in values (Gath 2009, p.249). Other scholars have taken it further 
by suggesting that a “messianic militarism”, based off of core values of “traditionalistic Christian 
religion” might account for the support of military intervention (Baker et al 2008). Either way, it 
is reasonable to assume that Evangelicals would view militant Islamists as a relevant outgroup. 
  The sociological research has focused on gun culture as a means of protecting against 
force by the United States government (Melzer 2009). However, the protectionist culture of gun 
ownership should also apply to outside militant groups. Muslims militants might be seen as a 
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particular threat because of 9/11 (Penning 2009). Gun owners there, might view Muslim 
militants as a relevant outside group.  
These different strains of research lead to six hypotheses that will be tested in the 
following section. My first hypothesis is that Evangelicals will be more supportive of the death 
penalty. Second, that they will be more supportive of foreign military intervention against 
Islamic militants. My third and fourth hypotheses focus on attitudes of gun owners. Specifically, 
my third hypothesis is that gun owners will be more likely to favor the death penalty; while my 
fourth hypothesis is that gun owners will be more likely to support military intervention. Finally, 
some evidence suggests that religious identity by itself might not be salient unless primed by 
another identity (Campbell et al. 2016). Therefore, my fifth and sixth hypotheses are that an 
interaction between gun owners and Evangelicals will yield an increase in support for both the 
death penalty and military intervention. 
                        
Data and Results 
 
 The overall argument is that Evangelicals and gun owners will support more aggressive 
and punitive policies than other Americans. To test this claim, I employ the 2016 American 
National Elections Survey (ANES). Two distinct policy areas, foreign policy and the death 
penalty, were chosen to provide multiple cases for examination. Altogether, four models were 
generated, two focusing on the death penalty and two on the use of military intervention in the 
Middle East. The dependent variable for the first two models come from responses to the 
question, “Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?” The 
military intervention models rely on the question, “Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor 
oppose the U.S. sending ground troops to fight Islamic militants, such as ISIS, in Iraq and 
Syria?”, to construct the dependent variable. Both dependent variables were dichotomized, with 
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zero indicating opposition and one meaning support for the policies.       
The use of demographic controls such as gender, education, race, were used as is 
consistent with other public opinion studies on the death penalty and foreign policy (Holsti 2004; 
Page 2006). Ideology is often correlated with policy preference and is controlled for (Guth 
2009). Partisan identity was added to the models during the analysis, but was left out of the final 
models because of its high correlation with several of the other variables as will be further 
addressed. Veteran status was used as a control for both studies. Psychologists have found 
unique perspectives on the death penalty by veterans (Feifel and Branscomb 1973). Post 
traumatic syndrome has also been shown to compound with other factors which increased the 
likelihood that veterans would commit crimes that caused them to be placed on death row 
(Giardino 2008). Controlling for veteran status in the death penalty models will allow for their 
unique attitudes to be accounted. When it comes to the use of military force, Giardino (2002) 
finds that when more veterans were placed in the executive branch and legislature, militarized 
action was less likely to be initiated by the United States. However, once a dispute was initiated, 
the use of military force became higher with a greater number of veterans serving in these 
branches. Therefore, veteran status was accounted for in the military force models.  
Lastly, authoritarian attitudes were controlled for by creating an index from four 
questions asked in the 2016 ANES. The question asked was, “Which one is more important for a 
child to have?”, followed each time by two responses: Independence or Respect for Elders, 
Curiosity or Good Manners, Obedience or Self-Reliance, Being Considerate or Well-Behaved. 
Evidence suggests that support for military intervention following September 11, 2001 is not the 
result of an “activation of authoritarianism” in the public, but rather, it is the result of non-
authoritarians becoming more aggressive in response to terrorism (Hetherington and Suhay 
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2011). Authoritarian attitudes have also been shown to positively correlate with support for the 
death penalty (Stack 2003; Stenner 2005). Controlling for authoritarianism saves the analysis 
from criticism of not accounting for these and other such studies.        
 The results of the analysis are found in Table 1. There is not support for the notion that 
Evangelicals are more likely to be supportive of either policy. This is a surprising result, not one 
that would be predicted based off of the literature on religious attitudes of military intervention 
or the death penalty. Yet this could be because, on its own, religion is not a significant factor 
(Campbell et al. 2016). Support for the claim that gun owners would be more supportive of the 
policies had mixed results. Gun owners did have more favorable attitudes towards the death 
penalty, but not towards military intervention.  
 Finally, my fifth and sixth hypotheses provide mixed evidence towards the notion that 
identifying as both a gun owner and an Evangelical would yield statistically significant results 
about attitudes towards the policies. Gun owning Evangelicals were more likely to support 
military intervention, but not the death penalty. It is noteworthy that partisan identity was left out 
of the models. The results were similar when adding partisanship to the models, except that the 
results for the interaction between gun owners and Evangelicals loses its statistical significance. 
Although this might indicate a lack of robust finding for the claim that gun owning Evangelicals 
are more supportive of military intervention, the removal of partisanship helps to eliminate a 
multicollinearity problem that plagues this study. Several of the independent variables contain 






Post analysis indicates that the probability of supporting the death penalty is greater 
among gun owners. The divergence between gun owners and the rest of the population is not 
only substantial, but statistically significant. The results indicate almost a 20 percent increase in 
probability of support for the death penalty among those owning guns. This gap between gun 
owners and other Americans cannot be causally associated with identity but indicates that more 
investigation is warranted.  
Post analysis on support for military intervention indicates a large probability of support 
from gun owning Evangelicals. What is particularly impressive about the result is that it does 
single out those who identify to both social groups. There is a 14 percent increase in likelihood 
of support for the aggressive policy. Those who do not identify as both being a gun owner and 
Evangelical have a 67 percent probability of supporting intervention, while those who do identify 
with both groups have an 81 percent chance.    
Conclusion 
 
 This chapter sought to address the question, does gun owner identity or an Evangelical 
identity lead to more punitive and aggressive policy preference? Support for two policies, the 
death penalty and the use of military force, were used to examine this question. Two of my 
hypotheses were that gun owners would be more supportive of both the death penalty and 
military intervention. I also hypothesized that Evangelicals would be more likely to support the 
policies. Finally, owing to the work done by Campbell et al. (2016), I hypothesized that gun 
owning Evangelicals would be even more likely to support the death penalty, and foreign 
military intervention. My analysis suggests several important conclusions. I will address three 
takeaways from this chapter, discuss weaknesses of the study, and finish by offering a suggestion 
for future research.     
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First, there is evidence to support the notion that gun owners are more likely to favor the 
death penalty when compared with other Americans. Social identity theory provides an avenue 
for understanding that response. It could be that gun owners become more punitive towards 
criminals, and perhaps other outside groups, as more pressure is placed on society to restrict gun 
access (see Tajfel and Turner 1979).   
Second, my results do not indicate that Evangelicals are more likely to support either the 
death penalty or military intervention. This could be because the out-groups selected in this 
chapter are not the most relevant group to Evangelicals. It could also mean that, for Evangelicals, 
the death penalty and military intervention are not the most important policies garnering their 
attention.  
Third, gun owning Evangelicals were more likely to support military intervention. This 
could be seen as support for Campbell et al. (2016) indirect effect hypothesis. The indirect 
hypothesis states that attitudes based off of religious identity are often not statistically significant 
on their own, but are when paired with another identity. Campbell and his colleagues (2016) 
suggest partisan identification. Here, I sought to challenge whether other social groups could 
interact in a meaningful way with religious identity. The statistical significance of gun owning 
Evangelicals on the likelihood of support for military intervention lends some credibility to the 
notion that other identities should be interacted with religious identity to fully understand the 
unique attitudes that arise from religious identity. 
Not all of the hypotheses were substantiated, however, useful information can still be 
derived from the null results. Perhaps, as with most public opinion research relying on social 
identity theory, one problem is that some of the conclusions are based off of logic, not data 
(Djupe and Calfano 2014, pg. 35; Djupe and Hunt 2009; Turner and Reynolds 2008 pg. 141). 
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Turner and Reynolds (2008) note that social conflict is not the result of one psychological 
process. Throughout this chapter I have posited that insecure identities and the need for positive 
esteem in society are correlated with conflict manifest in society (see Tajfel and Turner 1979). 
Perhaps a study, like the one in this chapter, would benefit from a different research design. A 
reliance on survey data can only explain so much. Relying on an experiment, or even a survey 
experiment, might help to address whether gun owners and Evangelicals are more punitive in 
their policy preferences. 
Another problem with the study is the reliance on both the death penalty and foreign 
policy to make an overarching claim about gun owners and Evangelicals. Both of these policies 
are nuanced, as are the reactions from individuals and social groups to them. It might be better if 
each policy were studied separately to better account for this variation or for each identity to be 
examined on their own. For instance, if gun owners and Evangelicals are responding to a lack of 
perceived esteem in society, their focus is likely to converge on a narrow set of outside groups. 
By separately looking at gun owners and Evangelicals, several outgroups, along with policies 












Bjarnason, Thoroddur, and Michael R. Welch. 2004. "Father Knows Best: Parishes, Priests, and 
American Catholic Parishioners' Attitudes Toward Capital Punishment." Journal for the 
Scientific Study of Religion 43 (1):103-18. 
Brown, Rupert, and Sam Gaertner. 2008. Blackwell Handbook of Social Psychology: Intergroup 
Processes. John Wiley & Sons. 
Campbell, David E., John C. Green, and Geoffrey C. Layman. 2011. "The Party Faithful: 
Partisan Images, Candidate Religion, and the Electoral Impact of Party 
Identification." American Journal of Political Science 55 (1):42-58. 
Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics. in Ideology and 
Discontent, Ed. David Apter. New York: Free Press.". 
Cottam, Martha L., Elena Mastors, Thomas Preston, and Beth Dietz. 2016. Introduction to 
Political Psychology. New York and London: Taylor and Francis Group. 
Diehl, Michael. 1990. "The Minimal Group Paradigm: Theoretical Explanations and Empirical 
Findings." European Review of Social Psychology 1 (1):263-92. 
Djupe, Paul A., and Brian R. Calfano. 2012. "The Deliberative Pulpit? the Democratic Norms 
and Practices of the PCUSA." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 51 (1):90-109. 
Djupe, Paul A., and Christopher P. Gilbert. 2008. The Political Influence of Churches. 
Cambridge University Press. 
33 
 
Djupe, Paul A., and Patrick K. Hunt. 2009. "Beyond the Lynn White Thesis: Congregational 
Effects on Environmental Concern." Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 48 (4):670-
86. 
Djupe, Paul, and Brian Calfano. 2013. God Talk: Experimenting with the Religious Causes of 
Public Opinion Temple University Press. 
Fea, John. 2018. "Evangelical Fear Elected Trump." July 16, 2018. 
 https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2018/06/a-history-of-evangelical-
fear/563558/. 
Feifel, Herman, and Allan B. Branscomb. 1973. "Who's Afraid of Death?" Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology 81 (3):282. 
Fetzer, Joel S. 2001. "Shaping Pacifism: The Role of the Local Anabaptist Pastor." Christian 
Clergy in American Politics:177-87. 
Fowler, Robert B., Allen D. Hertzke, Laura R. Olson, and Kevin R. Den Dulk. 2013. Religion 
and Politics in America: Faith, Culture, and Strategic Choices. Westview Press. 
Giardino, Anthony E. 2008. "Combat Veterans, Mental Health Issues, and the Death Penalty: 
Addressing the Impact of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Traumatic Brain 
Injury." Fordham Law Review 77:2955. 
Gilbert, Christopher P. 1993. The Impact of Churches on Political Behavior: An Empirical Study 
Greenwood Publishing Group. 
Hetherington, Marc, and Elizabeth Suhay. 2011. "Authoritarianism, Threat, and Americans’ 
Support for the War on Terror." American Journal of Political Science 55 (3):546-60. 
34 
 
Hill, Samuel S., and F. S. Mead. 1995. "Handbook of Denominations in the United States.". 
Hoffmann, John P., and John P. Bartkowski. 2008. "Gender, Religious Tradition, and Biblical 
Literalism." Social Forces 86 (3):1245-72. 
Hogg, Michael A., and Dominic Abrams. 1988. "Social Identifications.". 
Huckfeldt, R. R., and John Sprague. 1995. Citizens, Politics and Social Communication: 
Information and Influence in an Election Campaign Cambridge University Press. 
Huddy, Leonie. 2001. "From Social to Political Identity: A Critical Examination of Social 
Identity Theory." Political Psychology 22 (1):127-56. 
Jelen, Ted G. 1992. "Political Christianity: A Contextual Analysis." American Journal of 
Political Science: 692-714. 
Kellstedt, Lyman A., John C. Green, James L. Guth, and Corwin E. Smidt. 1996. "Grasping the 
Essentials: The Social Embodiment of Religion and Political Behavior." Religion and the 
Culture Wars: Dispatches from the Front 174192. 
Kleck, Gary. 1996. "Crime, Culture Conflict and the Sources of Support for Gun Control: A 
Multilevel Application of the General Social Surveys." American Behavioral Scientist 39 
(4):387-404. 
Lakoff, George. 1999. "Cognitive Models and Prototype Theory." Concepts: Core 
Readings:391-421. 
Murray, John C. 1960. "Is it Basket-Weaving? the Question of Christianity and Human 
Values." We Hold these Truths: Catholic Reflections on the American Proposition:175-96. 
35 
 
Patrick, Brian A. 2013. The National Rifle Association and the Media: The Motivating Force of 
Negative Coverage Arktos. 
Penning, James M. 2009. "Americans' Views of Muslims and Mormons: A Social Identity 
Theory Approach." Politics and Religion 2 (2):277-302. 
Smith, Gregory A. 2008. Politics in the Parish: The Political Influence of Catholic Priests 
Georgetown University Press. 
Stack, Steven. 2003. "Authoritarianism and Support for the Death Penalty: A Multivariate 
Analysis." Sociological Focus 36 (4):333-52. 
Stenner, Karen. 2005. The Authoritarian Dynamic Cambridge University Press. 
Tajfel, H., and J. Turner. 1986. "The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behaviour. U: 
Worchel S. Austin WG (Ur.) Psychology of Intergroup Relations." Chicago: Nelson Hall. 
Tajfel, Henri. 1981. Human Groups and Social Categories: Studies in Social Psychology CUP 
Archive. 
Tajfel, Henri, and John C. Turner. 1979. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict." The 
Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations 33 (47):74. 
Turner, John C., Michael A. Hogg, Penelope J. Oakes, Stephen D. Reicher, and Margaret S. 
Wetherell. 1987. Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-Categorization Theory. Basil 
Blackwell. 
Wald, Kenneth D., Dennis E. Owen, and Samuel S. Hill. 1988. "Churches as Political 
Communities." American Political Science Review 82 (2):531-48. 
36 
 
Wilcox, Clyde, Ted G. Jelen, and David C. Leege. 1993. "Religious Group Identifications: 
Toward a Cognitive Theory of Religious Mobilization." Rediscovering the Religious Factor 
in American Politics:72-99. 























Social Identity, Conservative Rights, and the Debate over Religious Freedom: 




 The United States Supreme Court recently ruled on the Masterpiece Cakeshop v. 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission case. Jack Phillips, a cake baker, sought exemption from 
Colorado’s anti-discrimination law, because he was religiously opposed to using his talents to 
celebrate a gay wedding. Under the law, businesses classified as public accommodations, cannot 
refuse service based on race, religion, color, sex, disability, or sexual orientation. Phillip’s 
bakery falls under the public accommodation provision of Colorado’s law. The Supreme Court 
ruled narrowly in favor of Mr. Phillips. The overall strategy used by his lawyer is symptomatic 
of recent changes in how conservatives are approaching the culture wars more generally. Andrew 
Lewis’s (2017) research documents the change in tactics made by conservatives, from using the 
language of morality in opposition to gay rights to instead using a religious rights frame. 
Phillip’s legal team claimed that an exemption to the law ought to be made, otherwise the court 
would be violating two of Mr. Phillip’s first amendment rights: the free exercise of religion and 
free speech.  
 Research is needed to better understand conservative groups’ use of the religious rights 
frame. However, before this can be done, a more basic understanding of social identity is useful 
in contextualizing the drive behind the strategic use of the frame. This chapter will be addressing 
several questions. First, although conservative commentators have railed against group identity 
as an appropriate metric of understanding self, social identity theory applies to conservative and 
religious groups as well. Evidence suggests that religious groups might have a stronger 
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identification with a religious social identity than do other groups with various social identities 
(Kinnvall 2004; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). As such, I will address the question, do religious 
social groups manifest attitudes and behaviors consistent with social identity theory?  
Second, now that activists from both sides of the political aisle are relying on support 
garnered by a claim to legal rights, court rooms and statehouses could be battle grounds between 
rights claims that seem to conflict with one another. As such, we need to better understand who 
is more likely to support a claim of religious rights, such as a small business owner’s right to 
refuse service based on religious grounds, versus who is more likely to see such a right’s claim 
as cover for discriminatory practices.  
  Although a turn to a religious rights frame is a recent trend, it is not unexpected group 
behavior. Social identity research has examined how groups respond to relevant outsiders. Of 
particular interest, research has shown that groups, in the face of negative social pressure, will 
change the dimensions surrounding an argument (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). This 
type of strategy can be seen by the pro-life movement, which adopted “unborn rights” language 
in their efforts to garner public support for their policy agenda (Lewis 2017). Now, religious 
freedom language is being adopted by religious groups in the face of dramatic Lesbian Gay 
Bisexual Transgender Queer (LGBTQ+) policy victories.       
 This chapter will proceed with an examination of the literature on social identity, with a 
focus on group attitudes and behavior. An explanation of interdisciplinary research on the use of 
the rights frame by conservatives and evangelicals will then be addressed. Special attention will 
be given to the development of Evangelical argumentation using a rights frame. Though research 
is beginning to investigate the shift in arguments being made by conservatives and evangelicals, 
research has yet to establish who is likely to agree with a religious rights frame. Furthermore, 
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this chapter makes a contribution by addressing the call to find a theoretical home for research on 
religious freedom legislation (Kazyak, Burke, and Stange 2018). Using social identity theory to 
understand the rise of the religious freedom frame enables researches with an outlet to examine 
debates over freedoms. 
I will address several questions: Do Evangelicals share a perception that Christians are 
being discriminated against? Do Evangelicals have a sense of shared fate as expressed by their 
desire to protect small business owners from anti-discrimination laws? I will analyze data from 
national surveys of American adults to develop a profile of who is more likely to support the 
religious freedom perspective. My analysis suggests that individuals who are evangelical, non-
black, male, Republican, and are Conservative, are more likely to think that Christians are being 
discriminated against, support small business’s refusal to provide services, and oppose 
protections to LGBTQ+ people.   
Social Identity Theory 
There are two components to our identities. We have an individual identity, one that is 
unique and distinct. We also organize ourselves and others into groups. Groups to which we 
belong are known as in-groups, while groups we do not belong to are called out-groups. A sense 
of belonging, shared fate (Kramer 1984), and perceptions of discrimination (Jetten 2001) each 
lead to the cohesion of a social group. Work done by Tajfel (1970) has posited that there is 
something inherent to group behavior, which leads to conflicts with relevant out-groups. Social 
identity theory was developed to explain the phenomena of inter-groups conflict (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). According to the theory, social identity is the part of an individual’s self-concept 
which stems from the knowledge of belonging to a social group, along with the value and 
emotional significance of that membership (Tajfel 1978, 63). We become emotionally attached 
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to our social groups because such groups are a part of our identity, how we see ourselves. 
Social identity theory has three basic assumptions. First, members of social groups 
endeavor to attain a sense of positive social identity. Second, the positive image of a social group 
is understood as a comparison between in-groups and relevant out-groups. This means that 
favorability is defined in relation to the image of other groups. Better positive social identity 
leads to benefits for group members. For example, individual self-esteem increases from the 
sense of belonging to a better group (Rubin and Hewstone 1998). Third, it is theorized that 
members will try to leave a group or join another group, which enjoys a more positive identity, 
when they are discontented with their social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979). These 
assumptions explain that groups struggle against each other to positively enhance their identity to 
the outside world and to members inside the social group. 
Social identity theory recognizes three variables that explain intergroup distinctions. The 
first may seem obvious. Members must internalize their perception of belonging to the group as 
part of their self-conceptualization. In simple terms, they have to identify as belonging to a social 
group. Another variable important when differentiating groups is the right social circumstances. 
A relevant out-group has to be manifest in society to allow for comparisons between groups. 
Remember, social identity theory posits that conflict derives from the desire to have a positive 
image in contrast to the out-group. Finally, out-groups have to be perceived by the in-group as a 
valid group for comparison. Otherwise, no conflict will occur. For instance, a school sponsored 
soccer team is unlikely to find a serious rival in a private debate team. Similarity, proximity, and 
situational salience have been shown to determine whether an out-group will be considered a 
viable comparison (Campbell 1958). 
As mentioned above, individuals might attempt to leave a group if they are not gaining 
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benefits from membership (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Leaving one’s social groups is no easy task. 
Remember that social identity becomes internalized by members and thus become part of their 
self-conceptualization (see van Knippenberg and Ellemers 1990; Roccas et al. 2008). Therefore, 
other, less drastic, responses are typically sought for before one leaves a social group. Reactions 
to a lowering in positive social identity include: comparing the in-group with the out-group on 
different dimension; reevaluating the comparison dimension, so that previous negative 
dimensions become positive; comparing one’s in-group to an out-group with lower status (Tajfel 
1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). 
 The first two responses deserve some clarification. An example of shifting the 
comparative dimension can be seen in a group which turns its focus from how much money they 
earn in a year, to how good their customer service record is. By playing to their strengths, this 
hypothetical group has changed where the finish line is and thus has placed them in a more 
positive light. By reevaluating the comparison dimension, we are referring to a change in how 
the dimension is framed. A recent example of reevaluating dimensions can be seen in a 2018 
initiative to stop illegal immigration. Opponents to the Trump administration have sought to 
change a dimension for comparison, zealousness of protecting the border, into a negative thing 
by highlighting the separation of children from their parents.   
With this understanding, we can now look at specific social groups. Research has focused 
on social identities based on race (Branscombe, Schmitt, and Harvey 1999), gender (Schmitt, 
Branscombe, and Postmes 2003), and nationality (Bond 2006). Less work has been done to 
utilize social identity theory to explain religiosity. Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman (2010) 
present empirical evidence that religious identity can lead to individual well-being, while 
simultaneously, generating unyielding conflict with out-side groups. Religion seems especially 
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salient during times of trial or when an individual’s sense of safety and security are threatened 
(Freeman 2003; Muldoon et al. 2007). Religion is also particularly useful to members in the face 
of an uncertain future (Kinnvall 2004). It has been suggested (Ysseldyk, Matheson, and Anisman 
2010), that part of the draw to religious social groups comes from their organized support 
networks (Graham and Haidt 2010; Lim and Putnam 2009) or the shared reliance on faith in a 
“higher power” (Pargament 2002).  
 Social groups benefit members by providing a sense of personal or collective self-esteem 
(Luhtanen and Crocker 1992). They also lead to the development of strong bonds between 
members (Cameron 2004). This might explain why group members have consistently shown a 
tendency to give rewards to in-group members (Billic and Tajfel 1973; Tajfel and Billic 1974), 
have a heightened sense of in-group attractiveness (Rabbie and Wilkins 1971), perceive 
similarities of other members (Allen and Wilder 1979; Linville and Jones 1980), and assign 
positive traits to in-group members (Howard and Rothbart 1980). 
 Religion is unique in providing “internal affective experiences” through rituals and 
sacred texts and stories (Wellman and Tokuno 2004). Such experiences might make religious 
social groups more personally significant to individuals than other social groups (Kinnvall 2004; 
Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007). Like other social groups (see Deaux 1985; Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 
2008; and Robinson and Kirkeby 2005), religion provides a belief system for members to funnel 
their experiences through and infuses meaning (Park 2007). Yet religion also invokes 
epistemological beliefs regarding what can (or cannot) be known, as well as ontological beliefs 
regarding what can (or cannot) exist (Nelson 2006). This in combination with a certainty that 
one’s religion is the only truth further inculcates members of religious groups with a strong sense 
of self-concept (Kinnvall 2004; Stark 2001; Wellman and Tokuno 2004). 
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 Although religion provides a distinct social identity, research indicates that there is some 
overlap between Christianity and political conservativism (Jost, Nosek, and Gosling 2008). This 
could be due to a shared desire in upholding traditional structures, like the family. Bonanno and 
Jost (2006) suggest that the overlap in identity is the result of desires to minimize uncertainty and 
threat that may be fulfilled by both types of ideologies.               
Public Opinion and the Religious Rights Frame 
Over the recent decades, public opinion about policies effecting LGBTQ+ individuals 
have seen a gradual shift. More Americans support same-sex marriage than oppose it (McCarthy 
2014, 2016, 2017; Pew Research Center 2014; Silver 2013). There is also increased support for 
policies protecting LGBTQ+ people from job and housing discrimination (Lax and Phillips 
2009; Lewis and Rogers 1999; Powell et al. 2010). Analyzing the data further, we find that 
women, the young, liberals, and non-religious individuals are the most supportive of pro-
LGBTQ+ policies (Brumbaugh et al. 2008; Haider-Markel and Joslyn 2005; Lewis 2011; Lewis 
and Gossett 2008; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison 2006; Pearl and Galupo 2007; Rowatt et al. 2009; 
Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek 2010; Swank, Woodford, and Lim 2013; Whitehead 2010; 
Woodford et al. 2012). While enjoying an increase in positive public support, opposition has 
come from the religious right.  
Conservative and religious groups have consistently advocated for policies that upheld 
their worldview, while vehemently opposing those that threatened the underpinnings of what 
they believe is morally acceptable. In 1997, the Supreme Court sided with the city of Boerne 
against Catholic Archbishop Flores leading to the diffusion of state religious freedom restoration 
acts (see chapter 3). Since that time, LGBTQ+ advocates won major victories in legalizing gay 
marriage (Obergefell v. Hodges), getting sexual orientation included in anti-discrimination 
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legislation, and winning over public opinion (Lax and Phillips 2009). Part of the success of 
LGBTQ+ activists have been in effectively using rights language to make their cases.  
Recent research has examined a shift in the reasoning used by the religious and social 
conservatives to persuade the larger public of their policy and legal objectives. Lewis (2017), in 
a recent book, has documented a shift in tactics during the debates over abortion. Pro-life groups 
started framing the debate in terms of “the rights of the unborn child”. Religious groups and their 
allies have likewise relied on both free market and rights frames in recent disputes over religious 
freedom legislation and legal battles in the courts (Kazyak, Burke, and Stange 2018). This shift 
in framing strategy follows the expected pattern established by the social identity literature. 
If we are to take an identity that is almost synonymous with social conservatives, 
Evangelical Christians provide a compelling illustration. Cultural schemas are developed and 
believed by social groups. We might question, how does social identity lead to a shift in 
framing? Social identity theory posits that when members of social groups are confronted with a 
negative social image, they will seek to shift perception by either focusing on another group, 
shifting perception of a criteria of evaluation from negative to positive, or shift the criteria being 
used (Tajfel 1978; Tajfel and Turner 1979). In the case of religious freedom laws and litigation, 
we see a shift of frames. 
Limited research has been done, on what can be termed, religious freedom bills. Recent 
studies have shown that varying levels of support in polls on religious freedom issues. For 
example, in an experimental survey, 53% of respondents said that a photographer should be 
allowed to deny their service for a gay wedding (Powell et al. 2017). Another survey, conducted 
in 2017, showed that only 32 percent of Americans believe that small business owners should be 
able to refuse services to gay and lesbian people on religious grounds (Cox and Jones 2017). 
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This discrepancy could indicate that wording is key when asking about religious rights.  
At the same time, sociologists have found that when religious groups perceive 
discrimination from the outside, church membership increases in devotion (Starke and Finke 
2000). Perceived discrimination is also a core component of strong bounds within a social group. 
The tendency to become more entrenched in one’s faith in the face of outside disapproval 
prevents affiliates from leaving the social group, another option for those facing negative social 
pressure.  
These findings lead me to three hypotheses that if substantiated will open the door to 
greater research using social identity theory and to better understand where Evangelicals fall on 
the question of religious freedom. The first hypothesis (H1) is that Evangelicals are more likely 
to perceive greater discrimination against Christians. If this is true, Evangelicals should be 
seeking a way to shift the negative perception. Large Evangelical support for small business 
owner’s right to refuse service to gays and lesbians on religious grounds would indicate that the 
rhetorical use of religious rights will be effective in garnering support from Evangelical religious 
communities. I believe this is because the rights frame is supported by most Americans. My 
second hypothesis (H2) is that Evangelicals will be more supportive of small business owner’s 
refusing service to gays and lesbians. Finally, to better solidify the use of social identity research 
in this area, I test to see if Evangelicals perceive discrimination against gays and lesbians, and 
their support for anti-discrimination legislation. I hypothesize (H3) that Evangelicals will 
perceive less discrimination against gays and lesbians and be less supportive of anti-
discrimination measures for sexual orientation.   
Results and Discussion 
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 According to social identity theory, a social identity is established by three components. 
First, the individual must belong to the social group. Second, there is often perceptions of 
discrimination. Third there is a sense of shared fate. This analysis seeks to establish evangelical 
identity as a social identity by demonstrating that evangelicals do perceive discrimination and 
have a sense of shared fate. To do so, I rely on data from two national surveys. The first was 
commissioned by the Atlantic and the Public Religion Research Institute (PRRI) and conducted 
by Social Science Research Solutions (SSRS). The survey is titled “PRRI/The Atlantic Poll: 
2016 White Working-Class Survey”. The survey was conducted by telephone and the sample 
size consisted of 3043 adults. The timeframe for the survey was between September 22, 2016 
and October 09, 2016.  
 The questions being addressed by this analysis are to establish who in the United States 
perceives discrimination against Christians and who supports allowing small business owners the 
ability to refuse services to gays and lesbians. Again, the hypothesis is that Evangelicals, who 
belong to a Christian social group, will be more likely to perceive discrimination against them. 
Second, Evangelicals should share a sense of common fate with other Christians in their social 
group. Therefore, I hypothesize that they will be supportive of allowing small business owners 
the ability to deny services for religious reasons. This makes sense, because of compounding 
factors. If Evangelicals, in particular, feel that they are being discriminated against, they will feel 
a shared fear of future discrimination from society. It is clear that this shared sense of fate would 
turn them to favor supporting religious business owners from what is being described as an 
attack on religious liberty (Kazyak, Burke, and Stange 2018).  
The dependent variable for the first model is constructed from a question which asked, 
“Just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against 
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Christians or not?” Independent variables include two measures for religious adherence. 
Religious attendance is included, as well as a variable for those who self-identify as Evangelical 
Christians. The survey asks those who identify as either Protestant or simply Christian: “would 
you describe yourself as a ‘born-again’ or evangelical Christian, or not?” Control variables 
included gender, age, education, race, income, partisan leanings, and ideology. The latter two 
control variables are particularly important because a competing hypothesis could be that 
ideology or party association is what is driving attitudes about small business owners and 
perceived discrimination (for instance, see Guth et al. 2006). While the Republican Party and 
evangelical religious groups have found common political rivals, and support each other’s world 
view, this does not take away from the independent effects of an Evangelical Christian identity.     
 Table 1 presents the results of a logistic regression model on the agreement or 
disagreement with whether Christians face discrimination. Identifying as Evangelical increases 
the log odds of perceiving discrimination against Christians. This evidence supports my first 
hypothesis.  
Other variables that were statistically significant include those who attend religious 
services “at least weekly”. This makes sense, because attending services regularly shows 
commitment to the social group. Not surprisingly, conservatives and Republicans were both 
more like to perceive Christian discrimination. As Evangelicals have been partnering with the 
Republican Party for decades to form the conservative right, this is not surprising. A result that 
was surprising was that as age increased, likelihood of perceiving discrimination decreased. I 
have no explanation for this result. It could be that older Americans are more likely to view 
society, in general, as one dominated by Christianity and thus do not buy into the notion that they 
are being discriminated against.    
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Figure 1 graphs the predicted probability that either an Evangelical or non-Evangelical 
perceives discrimination. The probability of selecting a Non-Evangelicals that perceives 
discrimination against Christians is just over 30 percent; while the probability of choosing an 
Evangelicals with a perception of discrimination is around 55 percent. These numbers show a 
clear contrast in attitudes between those associated with the social group compared to those who 
do not.  Evangelicals perceive discrimination from society. As such we should expect them to act 





Note: Logistic regression was the estimation technique used for these models. The dependent variable used for the death penalty models was derived by 
asking: "Just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot of discrimination against Christ ians or not?" The dependent variable used in 
denying service model was derived by asking: "Now, I’d like to get your views on some issues that are being discussed in the country today. All in all, do 
you strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose allowing a small business owner in your state to refuse to provide products or services to gay or 








For the next hypothesis, I not only utilize the “PRRI/The Atlantic Poll: 2016 White 
Working Class Survey”, but also a PRRI August 2016 Survey on LGBT issues. The dependent 
variable is generated from identical questions asked in both surveys. They ask, “Now, I’d like to 
get your views on some issues that are being discussed in the country today. All in all, do you 
strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose allowing a small business owner in your state to 
refuse to provide products or services to gay or lesbian people if doing so violates their religious 
beliefs?” The responses to these questions were dichotomized into those who favor or oppose the 
refusal of services.  
 This question is important to this research for two reasons. First, Evangelicals should 
support the refusal of services based off of religion because they should feel a sense of shared 
fate with other members of their social group. Second, although the question does not explicitly 
evoke rights language, it would prime Evangelicals to think in that frame. The question asks if 
religious beliefs are protected by the state law or not.  
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The independent variables in Table 2 differ from those in Table 1 in that religious 
attendance is not measured. Instead Table 2 adds responses from the question, “Now, please tell 
me if you completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with the 
following statement... Gay marriage goes against my religious beliefs.” This variable is 
dichotomized with 1 meaning the respondent agreed and 0 meaning they disagreed. This variable 
does not measure commitment to the social groups like attendance does, but does control for 
Evangelicals that either do not believe or do not know if gay marriage is against their religious 
beliefs. Many evangelicals point to certain passages of the Bible as a means of definitive proof 
against gay marriage. Evangelicals who are not aware of this, probably do not attend as often as 
those who do.   
Models from both surveys reflect that Evangelicals favor the right of a small business 
owner to refuse services to gay or lesbian couples. Republicans and conservatives were in 
agreement with Evangelicals but females were not. The results align well with what social 
identity theory would predict. Evangelicals perceive discrimination from society. Yet, they are 
willing to incur the disapproval of society by supporting other religious individual’s right to 
refuse service to the out-group. Although this analysis does not address it, social identity theory 
suggests that religious conservatives should try to shift or reframe the comparison dimension. 
Other research leads me to suspect that this is occurring in the form of a new religious rights 
frame that was successfully adopted by pro-life activists (Lewis 2017). 
Figures 2 and 3 show the probability that Evangelicals will support a small business 
owner’s right to refuse service based off religious beliefs. Figure 2 comes from the Atlantic 
sponsored survey, while Figure 3 comes from the in house PRRI survey. Not only do models 
from both surveys confirm the significance of an Evangelical identity, the graphs confirm the 
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impact of being Evangelical on attitudes towards the refusal of service to gays and lesbians. It is 
interesting to note that Evangelicals are quite ambivalent on the issue. The graphs show that if 
we were to take a random Evangelical out of the population, it is 50 percent probable that they 
will support the right to refuse service. This then might not seem that significant until we 
consider that the probability of a non-Evangelical favoring the right to refuse service to gays and 





Finally, not only should Evangelicals be sensitive to a perception of discrimination, not 
only should they support the rights of in-group members; they should also be ignorant of and 
even hostile towards the out-group.  The Gay and Lesbian Discrimination and Anti-
discrimination legislation models in Table 2 provide some evidence for this claim. These models 
are constructed from questions asked in the PRRI August Survey on LGBT Issues. The 
dependent variable for perceptions of discrimination against gay and lesbians came from the 
following question: “And thinking about American society… just your impression, in the United 
States today, is there a lot of discrimination against gays and lesbians, or not?”  
To get attitudes about anti-discrimination legislation, the survey asked, “Now, we would 
like to get your views on some issues that are being discussed in the country today. Do you 
strongly favor, favor, oppose or strongly oppose laws that would protect gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
and transgender people against discrimination in jobs, public accommodations, and housing?” 
The answers to both questions were dichotomized. Once again, logistic regression was applied 
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and the results, shown in Table 2, indicate that Evangelicals do not perceive discrimination 
against their out-group, nor do they support policy protecting them from discrimination. 
If we were to look at non-Evangelicals, the probability of randomly drawing a respondent 
from the population that perceives discrimination against gays and lesbians is over 60 percent. 
Among an Evangelical population, the probability of finding a respondent who perceives 




Figure 6 Shows the probability of an Evangelical favoring anti-discrimination legislation. 
If we were to take a random non-evangelical from the population, the probability that they would 
support some legislative measure to protect against discrimination is 75 percent. If we were to 
draw a random Evangelical out of the population, the probability of them supporting such 
legislation is 60 percent. Even though this is still above a 50 percent probability, compared to the 
rest of the population, Evangelicals stand out. Remember, the question asked about legislation 
55 
 
protecting against discrimination in employment, housing, and public accommodations. Many 
see these protections as necessities for LGBT individuals but they go largely ignored by 
Evangelicals. This blindness to an out-group is consistent with social identity theory, and the 
basic psychology of groups. 
 
For Evangelicals, it goes beyond the desire to protect the rights of the in-group. They are 
also blinded to threats to the out-group, and thus are not worried about legislation to protect 
them. These findings are consistent with social identity theory. Groups are in competition with 
one another. Individuals take on group characteristics as part of their identity. They become 
connected to the status of the social group and compare that status with a relevant out-group. 
This research demonstrates that groups are not able or willing to understand the plight of out-





Note: Logistic regression was the estimation technique used for these models. The dependent variable used for the GL discrimination 
model was derived by asking: “And thinking about American society… just your impression, in the United States today, is there a lot 
of discrimination against gays and lesbians, or not?” The dependent variable for the anti-discrimination model, stated: “Now, we 
would like to get your views on some issues that are being discussed in the country today. Do you strongly favor, favor, oppose or 
strongly oppose laws that would protect gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender people against discrimination in jobs, public 











This chapter focused on understanding conflict between social groups. To conclude, I 
will address three key takeaways from the research. First, Evangelicals in America today 
perceive themselves to be the targets of discrimination. We know from social identity theory that 
57 
 
when a social group is viewed negatively as compared to a relevant out-group, that they react in 
one of four ways. They could leave the group, although this is difficult because group identity is 
connected to an individual’s identity. In light of this, three other options are to change the 
dimensions upon which the group is compared to the relevant out-groups, change the framing of 
the current dimension from negative to positive, or the group could find another out-group that is 
not viewed positively by society to compare themselves with. One way in which religious groups 
have been changing the comparative dimension is by evoking rights language.  
This leads to our second takeaway; Evangelicals show increased support for the rights of 
small business owners to refuse services to gays and lesbians because of religious objection. The 
shift from the focus on what is morally right to the religious objection rights of business owners 
is consistent with research showing an overall change in conservative strategy (Lewis 2017). 
This research shows that Evangelicals, conservatives, Republicans, and men are more likely to 
agree with religious objections. Future research is needed to see how impactful this new frame is. 
Research should also address if the new frame is more impactful on Evangelicals than other 
strategies, like the moral frame previously used. 
Third, in-groups generally do not perceive discrimination towards the out-group (Turner 
and Reynolds 2008). The results suggest that Evangelicals are unlikely to agree with the claim 
that gays, lesbians, bisexuals, and transsexuals are being discriminated against. The models do 
not provide understanding into why this is the case; however, social identity theory posits that 
group identity is comparative in nature; therefore, it seems reasonable to suggest that groups are 
blinded to the plight of groups they are in competition with. This research does not get at where 
Evangelicals perceive the sources of discrimination against their groups to be coming from. Such 
research would be useful in tying in some of the findings here. For instance, if the perceived 
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discrimination is coming from LGBT activists, this could explain blindness to discrimination 
against LGBT individuals. This might also explain why Evangelicals do not support anti-
discrimination policies.  
Another key question needing to be addressed is what form does this perceived 
discrimination take. It seems that Evangelicals see rights as a zero-sum game. If so, anti-
discrimination laws would be threatening to Evangelicals who see them as a means for 
government and activists to clamp down on their religious freedoms. Research addressing the 
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Chapter Four  
Responding to the Court: The Diffusion of Religious Freedom Acts  
Introduction 
 
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) of 1993 passed without much 
controversy. It had bipartisan support, passed unanimously in both houses (apart from three 
senators), and signed into law by President Clinton (Hamilton 1998). Since 1993, states have 
passed their own versions of RFRA. Today such bills are the center of controversy. Some worry 
that such bills will legalize discrimination. A simple appeal to religion would thwart years of 
civil rights legislation. This is of particular concern for LGBTQ+ citizens and their allies in the 
wake of the Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in the Obergefell v. Hodges case legalizing marriage 
equality. Can a refusal to bake a cake, or arrange flowers be made for religious reasons? Others 
argue that RFRAs protect religious groups from being the targets of government coercion (see 
Laylock 1993). Perhaps due to initial bipartisan support on the federal level, political scientists 
have failed to give needed attention to state RFRAs. More research, like a better understanding 
of RFRAs, sheds light on the balance between two essential freedoms protected by the 
Constitution of the United States. 
This chapter examines the question: What causes state governments to adopt a religious 
freedom restoration act (RFRA)? By using event history analysis, we can get a sense of the 
internal and external determinants impacting the likelihood of state adoption. Specifically, this 
article looks at the impact of factors such as evangelical population (Berry and Berry 1990; 
Mooney and Lee 1995; Roh an Berry 2008), regional diffusion (Mooney and Lee 1995; 
Boehmke and Witmer 2004), and vertical influences coming from the federal government (Allen, 
Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004; Hoekstra 2009). 
The rest of this chapter will proceed as follows. First, I will explain a brief history of 
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RFRAs. Then I will address the two theoretical frames that will be used to understand the 
passage of RFRAs in the states: morality policy and innovation and diffusion. I will test theories 
of the role of evangelicals, regions, and the federal government on the passage of state RFRAs. I 
do so by employing pooled cross-sectional time series data (1993-2015). My findings provide 
mixed evidence that the presence of evangelicals influences the passage of RFRA in certain 
regions of the United States (the south). I also present evidence that states respond to decisions 
made on the federal level. I conclude by discussing the theoretical and empirical implications of 
my findings. 
Setting the Stage: Federal RFRA 
In the early 1990s, frustration with Supreme Court rulings surrounding the Free Exercise 
Clause came to a breaking point for some religious organizations. The decision reached in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith was particularly 
frustrating to these religious organizations (see Hamilton 1998). The Employment Division of 
the state of Oregon had refused to give unemployment benefits to Alfred Smith, who was fired 
for smoking peyote. At the time, Oregon prohibited the use of peyote, but Smith argued that this 
violated his first amendment right, because the use of peyote was part of a religious ritual. He 
belonged to the Native American Church. The case went all the way to the Supreme Court, 
which decided that the state of Oregon could deny unemployment benefits to an individual for 
smoking peyote, even if the drug was part of a religious ritual (Employment Div. v. Smith 1990).  
In response to this decision, a coalition of churches and religious organizations petitioned 
Congress for added protection for religious exercise (see Laylock 1993). Groups such as the 
National Association of Evangelicals, the Christian Life Commission of the Southern Baptist 
Convention, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints, U.S. Catholic Conference, and the 
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Home School Legal Defense Fund3, were among some of the most active in petitioning 
Congress. These groups received bipartisan support from the legislature and in 1993, Congress 
passed the federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
The act put greater responsibility on the government to show that laws did not target 
religious expression. RFRA protected religious liberty claims, unless government could show a 
compelling societal interest in prohibiting religious behavior. In these instances, the government 
still had to use the least restrictive means to serve its interest (RFRA 1993, 103d). Soon 
thereafter, the Catholic Archbishop of San Antonio, Patrick Flores, sued the City of Boerne, 
Texas, for refusing his petition to expand his church. City of Boerne officials cited its historic 
preservation law, noting that the church was in a historic district and was a contributing property 
(City of Boerne v Flores 1997). 
The case was shepherded through the court system by the same religious organizations 
that promoted the passage of RFRA. They would be disappointed once again; the Supreme Court 
ruled in favor of the City of Boerne (City of Boerne v Flores 1997, 2172). Before the Boerne 
decision only two states, Connecticut and Rhode Island had adopted a state version of the 
RFRAs. Since 1998, nineteen other states have adopted a version of RFRA (Johnson and 
Steinmetz 2015).   
Morality Policy 
 
 The study of public policy is complicated by the sheer amount of policies enacted on the 
local, state, and federal levels. Researchers have developed different approaches to make sense 
                                                             
3  (See, e.g., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Hearing on S. 2969 Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
102d Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (Restoring Religious Liberty in America: An Analysis of the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act by Coalitions for America) (full text on file with the B.Y.U. Law Review); Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 
1991: Hearings on H.R. 2797 Before the Subcomm. On Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1992) [hereinafter House Hearings] (statement of Robert Dugan, Jr., Director, 
Office of Public Affairs, National Association of Evangelicals); id. at 23 (statement of Elder Dallin H. Oaks, Quorum 
of the Twelve Apostles, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints). 
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of policymaking. Some scholars focus on the policy process. Early work in this area utilized the 
stages heuristic, which broke down the process into “stages”. Such stages include formation, 
implementation, and evaluation (Jones 1970; Anderson 1975; and Peters 1986). Later research 
has criticized the stiffness of the process as described in the stages heuristic juxtaposed to reality 
(Cochran et al. 2006, 7). The stages heuristic is not a causal theory, contains no assumptions 
about what drives the process, and has few falsifiable hypotheses (Sabatier 1991). Later work has 
expanded this original conceptualization by developing theories of the policy process (see 
Sabatier and Weible 2014). 
 A second approach divides policies into substantive areas to be examined. Some common 
areas include budgetary policy, health care, welfare, and foreign and military policy. In more 
recent years, scholarship has turned to policies surrounding social values. Categories like 
abortion, drugs, and the death penalty were studied using the morality policy framework (Meier 
1994; Mooney, Christopher Z., and Mei-Hsien Lee 1995; Mooney and Lee 2000).   
 The third approach relies on categorization of policies based on their characteristics 
(Lowi 1964). The very nature of a policy, its categorization, produces a unique political 
environment. Policy scholars have created several categories over the years including 
distributive, redistributive, and regulatory policies (Hwang and Gray 1991; Gormley 1986; 
Hopkins and Weber 1976). Such research has focused on the atmosphere surrounding economic 
policy. Another type of policy, morality policy, is governed by different politics and adoption 
patterns (Meier and McFarlane 1992). A greater understanding of the context by which policies 
are debated paves the way for researchers to develop and test hypotheses. The latter two 
approaches have informed, what has been termed, morality policy.  
There have been several definitions of morality policy proposed throughout the years. 
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Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) propose that so long as one advocacy coalition involved in a 
policy debate portrays an issue as one of morality, or sin, then it can be categorized as a morality 
policy. Therefore, it is not necessary for both sides to use moral arguments. In fact, most of the 
time, conservatives, particularly the religious right, are the ones that make an issue into a moral 
policy debate (Gibson 2004). Meier (1999, 681) described morality policies as “the politics of 
sin”, that are either condoned or condemned by society.  According to Tatalovich and Daynes 
(1988) morality policies are designed to instigate behavioral change in society. These definitions 
indicate that morality policies seek to regulate social norms or evoke strong moral responses 
from citizens (Tatalovich and Daynes 1988; Mooney and Lee 1995).  
Depending on the definition, morality policies can be categorized into Lowi’s (1964) 
typology differently. There are four categories in the typology: distributive, protective, 
regulatory, competitive regulatory, and redistributive. Meier (1999) argues that morality policies 
should be seen as redistributive, because groups are seeking to place their values on others. As 
Mooney and Lee (2000) put it, “values are ‘redistributed’ because one group has its values 
affirmed by a policy change, while another has its values repudiated.” At the same time morality 
policies have been argued to fall within the category of distributive policy (see Meier 1999) and 
regulatory policy (Gormley 1986). 
Morality policies are characterized by high salience to the public, leave little room for 
compromise, and are marked by value-driven arguments. These three characteristics create an 
environment where widespread public engagement is likely (Mooney and Schuldt 2008). Some 
researchers have found that perhaps morality policies are not always extremely salient to the 
public. Haider-Markel and Meier (1996) find that there are two models that can be used to 
describe gay and lesbian politics in the United States. Salience to the public is what determines 
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which model is most appropriate. When salience is high, the morality politics model is a better 
fit. When salience is low, an interest group model provides a better explanation for policy 
adoption. Under the latter model, policy is determined by coalition resources, support from 
elites, and prior public policy (Haider-Markel and Meier 1996).  
Morality policies are distinct in four ways. First, morality policies are tied to deep held 
value systems, which leave little room for compromise (Mooney and Lee 1995; Gibson 2004). 
Compromise on foundational values, often referred to as “first principles” (Mooney 1999), 
necessitates the sacrifice of at least one of those core values. Understanding this primary 
characteristic is important for determining other important qualities of morality policies.     
Morality policies tend to be highly salient to the public (Haider-Markel 1999), although 
some scholars have found evidence to suggest otherwise (Mooney and Schuldt 2008). Either 
way, morality policies are certainly salient to certain groups, namely the religious right, and 
those their policies would impact. States with higher proportions of religious citizens should be 
more likely to have elites that pay attention to its religious citizenry. Democratic theory would 
suggest that citizen values ought to direct public policy (Key 1961).   The fact that morality 
policies are salient to some groups impacts most legislatures. 
Due to the value-based arguments usually made for morality policy, there is less need for 
the opinions of elites or for the public to look into an issue for more information (Mooney and 
Schuldt 2008). Morality policies are perceived as “easy issues”, therefore everyone can claim to 
be legitimately informed (Carmines and Stimson 1980).  However, when saliency is low, interest 
groups are able to generate influence on political actors (Haider-Markel 1999). Ambitious 
elected officials benefit from adopting positions close to their constituents. Whereas economic 
regulatory policy is driven by sociological variables like income and urbanization, we expect 
70 
 
morality policy to be driven by religious factors or political factors (Mooney 2001; Koopman 
2009, 550).   
The last characteristic of morality policy is that they tend to have widespread citizen 
participation (Mooney and Lee 2000). Research shows that despite constituencies’ low interest 
and knowledge of state governments, policy creation and adoption are influenced by ideological 
orientations of mass publics (Erikson, Wright, and McIver 1993).  In his seminal piece on 
congress, Mayhew (1974) suggests that legislatures’ primary goal is to get re-elected. A 
legislature who perceives that their constituents are mobilized to participate based off of morality 
polices are more likely to use caution to not alienate voters. This includes the adoption of 
policies that are perceived favorable by the public (Miller and Stokes 1963). 
 Morality policies have historically been left to the states. The reservation of power to the 
states, embodied in 10th Amendment, allowed for closer policy-opinion congruence (Mooney 
2000). Mooney argued that actions by the federal government to usurp state authority on 
morality policies can lead to extended policy activity, especially in states high in preference 
heterogeneity and religiosity.   
Diffusion of Innovations Framework: State RFRAs 
This paper draws on the diffusion of innovations framework to understand the spread of 
state RFRAs. Policy diffusion models clarify how states can adopt policies relatively quickly, 
despite institutional frictions (Walker 1969). Governments do not operate within a vacuum. They 
learn from the policy decisions made in other jurisdictions. The process of watching and 
emulating other governments is known as diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990). The policy diffusion 
of innovations framework allows researchers to study the factors leading to new innovations in 
policy. According to the diffusion framework, a policy is innovative so long as it is new to the 
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jurisdiction adopting it (Walker 1969). Therefore, if a state adopts a bill emulating another, it is 
still considered an innovation to that state.  
In their study, Berry and Berry (1990) combine diffusion models with policy models 
utilizing characteristics of governments, internal determinants, to predict policy adoption. 
Internal determinants are political, economic, and social characteristics that lead to policy 
innovations (Walker 1969). For example, religious and ideologically conservative states are 
more likely to adopt morality polices that seek to regulate “sinful” behavior (Haider-Markel 
2001). A high number of religious groups and an ideologically conservative population are 
examples of social factors impacting policy innovation. The other component needed to utilize 
this theoretical perspective is a diffusion explanation.  
The most predominate diffusion explanation is that states learn from each other (see 
Gilardi 2006; Sylvester and Haider-Markel 2015). This is particularly true when the policy is 
successful in its attended purpose (but see Volden 2006). For example, state officials were more 
likely to propose tax and expenditure limits when geographical neighbors passed similar 
legislation (Seljan and Weller 2011). Government leaders imitate effective leaders from other 
states (Karch 2007). This can be due to the credibility of neighboring state leaders, or if 
jurisdictions have similar partisan and ideological orientations (Grupp and Richards 1975; 
Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004). Government leaders take cues from similar 
states to help them understand how the electorate and other state elites will react to policy. 
Mississippi’s adoption of academic bankruptcy laws is an excellent example (Grossback, 
Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004). The laws are slightly different across the states, but the 
laws essentially allow state elites the ability to take over operating school districts that 
consistently fail to meet standards. State’s that had conservative leaders were more likely to 
72 
 
adopt the policy than states with liberal elites.  
Although many studies have shown that states influence each other, there has been debate 
over the years about how diffusion works. Early studies used neighbor models (Mintrom 1997; 
Mintrom and Vergari 1998). They hypothesized that the probability of a state adopting a policy 
is directly influenced to the proportion of bordering states that had previously adopted. Other 
models expanded the scope of interactions by assuming a collectivity of jurisdictions, a region, 
had a greater impact on governmental adoption (Mooney and Lee 1995). Both types of models 
add to our understanding of the different influences that nearby jurisdictions have on 
governments. Since, scholars have argued that states learn from and emulate states that are 
similar to them (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 2004; Sylvester and Haider-Markel 
2016). States learn and emulate states that share an ideological view. These scholars measure the 
diffusion of policy by capturing ideological distances using Berry et al. (1998) state government 
liberalism indicator.    
Diffusion models have been used to understand the effects of the National government on 
the states (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004; Hoekstra 2009). Allen, Pettus, and Haider-
Markel (2004) show how vertical dimensions effect policy diffusion. The authors put forward 
five propositions to account for federal influence on state policy adoption, two of which pertain 
to our study on state RFRAs. Their third proposition states that a state will be more likely to 
adopt a policy when it is consistent with an unambiguous United States Supreme Court decision 
regarding that policy (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004). Their fifth proposition states that 
when the national government is split in their policy preferences, the states are more likely to 
adopt relevant new policies on their own. This work provides a case study for when the U.S. 
Supreme Court takes a clear constitutional stance, but members of Congress clearly disapprove 
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of the decision. This provides two distinct signals from the federal government. This 
entanglement between two separate powers within the federal government likewise provides 
added cover for states to enter the policy arena. Diffusion models can indicate when states work 
together to try and ignore or circumvent federal prerogatives in the face of dual signals from the 
national level. Despite a clear signal from the Court, I suspect that opponents to the decision will 
be emboldened by Congress’ prior repudiation of the Court’s authority. Upon reflection of the 
morality policy and innovation and diffusion literatures, I put forward three hypotheses and the 
passage of RFRAs.  
First, Although the morality policy literature does inform us that greater portion of 
religious influence in a state will affect the adoption of morality policies, little work has been 
done to show how this influence leads to policy diffusion (Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney and 
Lee 1995; and Roh and Berry 2008). To move the literature on morality policy forward I test a 
religious influence hypothesis. The religious influence hypothesis suggests that states with higher 
proportions of evangelical (sometimes referred to as fundamentalists) populations will be more 
likely to pass state versions of the RFRA.     
Second, the literature on innovation and diffusion suggests that states will learn from 
other states which are ideologically similar to them (Grossback, Nicholson-Crotty, and Peterson 
2004; Sylvester and Haider-Markel 2016), or are in the same region of the country (Berry and 
Berry 1990; Boehmke and Witmer 2004). However, when the policy in question is couched in 
terms of morality, we should expect that religious influence should still play a role in adoption. I 
hypothesize that states with higher amounts of religious population and that are ideologically or 
regionally similar will be more likely to adopt a RFRA. 
Conservative states promote traditionalism, or in policy terms, the status quo. This is 
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especially true for morality policies, and policy surrounding institutions like the family and 
churches. Therefore, it makes sense that RFRA policies should diffuse in those states that are 
more conservative or have Republicans in office. Although different, ideology and partisanship 
are related. Under this same logic, we should expect that certain regions of the country, those 
that are more traditional, should be more likely to support the adoption of RFRA. Research has 
classified the southern states as having a traditional political culture (Elazar 1970). I expect that 
the southern states will be most likely to diffuse RFRAs.  
Third, the vertical diffusion hypothesis is built off of the work of Allen, Pettus, and 
Haider-Markel (2004), who suggest that vertical diffusion forces play a role in the adoption of 
state policy. I test a variation of their fifth proposition, that when the federal government is 
unclear in their preferences states will take the lead in adopting policy. It is not the case that the 
Supreme Court was unclear about its position in the 1997 Boerne V. Flores decision, however, 
there are two distinct signals being sent from the court and the legislature. Groups who favored 
the federal RFRA were once again dealt a defeat by the Supreme Court. The actions of Congress 
provided some cover to those states interested in passing similar legislation. Therefore, the 
vertical diffusion hypothesis suggests that innovations are more likely to occur in the years 
following the Supreme Court’s 1997 decision in Boerne V. Flores, a time in which the legislative 
and judicial branches sent different signals to the religious community.    
Research Design and Variable Measurement 
Following most work in policy diffusion, event history analysis (EHA), was used to 
examine the effects of internal and external factors (see Berry and Berry 2007; Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). Event history analysis also goes by the name of survival models. 
This is because they analyze the length of time before an event happens. Early on, these models 
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were used in biostatistics to determine the time before the death of patients. In this case, we are 
examining the time before a state adopts a RFRA. Researchers relying on such models are 
implicitly interested in risk. For example, what is the risk that a state adopts a proposed policy? 
Since we are dealing with discrete events, either a state adopts the bill or does not adopt, I use 
logistic regression models to analyze the data (Berry and Berry 2007). 
A benefit of event history analysis is that it is comparative in nature. Not only can we 
compare states, but these models allow us to account for regional patterns, and the influence of 
shared state partisan and ideological leanings. RFRAs draw support from two sources. First, 
religious groups. The initial push for legislation came from religious groups that felt slighted by 
the opinions of the Supreme Court on religious questions. I theorize that Evangelical Christians 
would take up the fight for securing religious freedom. Evangelicals are not spread evenly across 
the states. Therefore, accounting for region is important. Second, because of the close association 
between conservative religious groups and the Republican Party, I suspect that ideologically 
similar states will be at more risk of adopting RFRAs.4     
Dependent Variable 
I used Johnson and Steinmetz’s (2015) timeline to account for the years in which states 
adopted RFRAs. I verified the adoption years through the National Conference of State 
Legislatures website. States were coded with a zero from 1993 until they adopted a version of the 
bill. Once they did, they were coded as a one and dropped from the model. This is because event 
history analysis is supposed to be used on non-reoccurring events. Theoretically, a state could 
readopt a different version of the original state RFRA. This has only occurred once with state 
RFRAs; therefore, this should not impact the study. Figure 1 provides a diagram of the United 
                                                             
4 I use the term risk not to denote some opinion on RFRAs but rather because the literature on survival models uses 




States in which those states that have adopted a RFRA are shaded. Most recent adopters are 





Note: data compiled by the author based on information from the National Conference of State Legislatures 
Independent Variables 
State Internal Factors. A measure for evangelical population and the number of 
evangelical congregations in each state were used as proxies for religious interest group 
mobilization. I use evangelical population in two models and number of congregations in another 
model. This is because congregations seem to be a better measure of support from religious 
organizations because churches were big supporters of the federal RFRA. Evangelical population 
was used because some organizations supporting the federal RFRA were not actually churches 
but organizations with religious members.  
Figure 1: Map of RFRA adoption 
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The evangelical population measure was created using Gibson’s (2004) measure for 
evangelicals. This measure captures the percentage of evangelicals per state. However, the data 
is only for the year 1990. I used his percentage for all of the years. This is a major limitation of 
my study. The evangelical congregation’s measure utilized the Glenmary data from 2000 and 
2010 (see Jones 2010). The Glenmary Mission is an organization which does religious censuses 
every ten years. They have a measure for evangelical congregations that were used. Interpolation 
was used to fill in the missing years.  
Vertical Dimension. A variable for the year 1998 was included in the model because that 
is the year after the Supreme Court’s Boerne V. Flores decision. Those favoring RFRAs had 
already been frustrated with the Court’s past decisions regarding the free exercise of religion. 
Congress signaled their disapproval of the Court by passing the federal RFRA. By overturning 
the federal RFRA, the Court not only angered supporters of RFRAs but once again highlighted 
the ambiguity of the federal government on the issue. This “Court Decision” variable will allow 
us to test Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel’s (2004) proposition that under conditions of 
ambiguous national preferences, states will respond by taking the lead in passing legislation. 
This is compounded by the fact that evangelicals might be looking for another outlet to show 
their displeasure with the Court.  
External Variables. A regional diffusion variable was created by dividing the number of 
states within a region that had previously adopted a bill by the total number of states within that 
region. For example, to calculate the regional diffusion score for Mississippi in the year 2014, I 
divided the number of southern states that had adopted the bill previous to 2014 by all southern 




My second measure of external forces follows Grossback et al. (2004) measure of 
ideological distance. They argue that states are more likely to learn or emulate those states which 
are ideologically similar. A state with a high liberal score is less likely to adopt a policy 
favorable to a conservative state. Like others in the diffusion literature, I utilize the state 
government liberalism scores created by Berry et al (1998). Then, I calculated the distance using 
the following formula:  
Ideological Distance = ABS([(MostRecentAdopterIdeo. 
+ AllOtherAdopterIdeo.) / 2] – PotentialAdopter) 
 
Other formulas for capturing ideological distance have been proposed (see Sylvester and 
Haider-Markel 2016), however, the original formula proposed by Grossback et al. (2014) fits this 
project best. Since I am looking at years from 1993-2015, giving greater weight to the most 
recent adopter’s ideology is necessary.    
Control Variables. A measure of citizen ideology was taken from the revised 1960-2013 
citizen ideology series (Berry et al. 1998). Since this data did not go to 2015, the 2013 score was 
used for the subsequent years. Since, churches from several denominations supported the federal 
RFRA, it is important to control for citizen ideology. It seems that the Religious Right has been 
more supportive of state RFRAs even if the federal law received bipartisan support. The citizen 
ideology measure will make sure that state RFRAs are not merely a response to ideological 
pressures.  
State government ideology is important to control for because the hypothesis suggests 
that it is the presence of evangelicals will influence the likelihood of policy adoption. This 
should be the case whether or not state elites are supporting the passage of RFRAs. Government 
ideology was measured using the NOMINATE measure of state government ideology (Berry et 
al. 2010). The most current update to this data correlates highly, .9894, with the previous 
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version. Berry et al. (2010) recommend relying on the NOMINATE version of state government 
ideology due to its stronger performance in the various validity tests reported in their article.       
Governors hold a lot of state power; however, the literature is mixed on whether the 
partisanship of the governor has a significant effect on morality policy (Wetstein 1996) or 
whether the presence of a governor has the side effect of mobilizing those not of their party 
(Camobreco and Barnello 2008). In either case, the governor’s power to veto legislation is a key 
factor in the passage of any bill; therefore, a control was added to account for this influence.   
Governor’s ideology was measured by combining the Nominate 1960-2004 government 
ideology series (Berry et al. 2010) with information from the National Governor’s Association. 
Years during which a Republican governor was in office received a 1 otherwise 0 was used for 
all other parties. Berry et al. (2010) expects that the orientation of a governor is equal to the 
average orientation of state legislators. This is how governors were measured through 2004. 
Since the nominate 1960-2004 government ideology series only went until 2004 information 
from the National Governor’s Association on past and present governors was used to fill in the 
gaps through 2015. If there was a discrepancy due to replacement in the middle of the year, the 
party identification of the governor who had been in most of the year was used. 
Finally, a control for the year after Congress adopted the federal version of the RFRA, 
was included. This is to see if Congress’ signal of approval would influence state adoption. The 
year after the adoption of the federal bill was used because of the time it would take the states to 
adopt policy in response to the federal government.   
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 displays the results of the logistic regression models. There are two models that 
were used to analyze the data. The first model is the full model with all independent variables 
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included. The second model adds an interaction between the regional diffusion variable and 
Evangelical population. Remember that three hypotheses were proposed to explain the passage 
of state RFRA. First, the religious influence hypothesis suggests that a higher presence of 
Evangelicals as a proportion of overall state population, would increase the likelihood of RFRA 
adoption. The results from the first model do not support the hypothesis. Evangelicals were not a 
statistically significant factor in the passage of state RFRAs.     
However, by interacting Evangelical population with the regional diffusion variable, we 
start to get a clearer picture of Evangelical influence. The interacted term is significant at the .1 
level. This is not conclusive evidence of the role of Evangelicals, but does suggest that within 
regions where adoption of RFRA is higher, Evangelical presence might make a greater 
difference. This makes sense because religious groups and the southern states share a similar 
culture of traditionalism when it comes to protecting church activities. However, further 
evidence is needed to make a more conclusive argument.  
Another explanation for the lack of Evangelical influence could be that these policies 
have been generally accepted by the Republican Party, and conservatives. The variables 
accounting for partisan and ideological influence appear to be insignificant, however, here is 





      Table 1: Passage of State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts 












Government Ideology  -0.006 
(0.015) 
   -0.017 
(0.017) 




Citizen Ideology   -0.040# 
 (0.021) 
            -0.033 
(0.022) 
Boerne Decision      2.064** 
 (0.779) 








Regional    5.376*** 
 (1.284) 
            2.267 
(2.128) 












Number of Cases 
     -86.269 
      172.538 
       233.889 
190.538 
         913 
       -84.525 
       169.051 
       237.218 
       189.051 
          913 
Notes: Coefficients are logistic regression coefficients; standard errors are in parentheses.  ** p < .01, * p < .05, # p 






Further work might focus on the effect that the Republican Party has on promoting state RFRA 
and other morality policies supported by Evangelicals.   
The first model shows that the regional diffusion variable is significant. The second 
model does not because of the interaction term. To better grasp the effect of regional diffusion,  
Figure 2 is a graph of the predicted probabilities by how many states within a region already 
adopted a RFRA. The graph shows that adoption was more probable once more than half the 
region had adopted the legislation. Looking back at Figure 1, which shows which states adopted 
RFRAs, we can see that the south is driving this effect. Once 70 percent of the states in the South 
adopted a RFRA, the probability that other states would adopt went up about 15 percent. 








Finally, the vertical diffusion hypothesis suggest that the states would respond to the 
Supreme Court’s 1997 Boerne V. Flores decision. Figure 3 shows the predicted probabilities 
before and after the Boerne decision. The graph shows a modest, 3 percent increase in 
probability for the years after the decision. However, I suspect that the Boerne decision had 
greater influence the years right after the decision was made and then that effect slowly tapered 
off. To demonstrate this effect, diffusion studies often include a Hazard Rate variable (Box-
Steffensmeier and Jones 1997; Mooney and Lee 1995; Sylvester and Haider‐Markel 2016). The 
Hazard Rate accounts for the risk of adoption (Mooney and Lee 1995). It is generated by taking 
the number of RFRA adoptions each year and divide it by the total number of states not 
previously having adopted a state RFRA (See Mooney and Lee 1995).  
 The Hazard Rate variable was not included in the final models presented in Table 1. This 
is because it is collinear with the Boerne decision variable. Table 2 shows the hazard rate for 
each year covered in the study. The probability of adoption is greatest from 1998 through 2000. 
The following year, the probability goes down to zero. This indicates that the Boerne decision 












Table 2: Annual Hazard Rates for State Adoption of RFRA 



























   
 
Conclusion 
Since 1993, several states have adopted religious freedom restoration acts (RFRAs), to 
give added protection to the free exercise of religion. In recent years these bills have been at the 
center of controversy. The primary question is if, and to what extent does the Constitutional 
protection of religious exercise supersede other constitutional rights. Of particular concern are 
civil rights protections against discrimination. My research explored the diffusion of state 
RFRAs, which I classified as morality policies. By using Event History Analysis and state level 
data, we found mild support for the conclusion that Evangelical population influenced the 
passage of state RFRAs within regions where high adoption already occurred. This stands in 
contrast to other research that found a more robust effect of Evangelicals on the adoption of 
morality policies (Berry and Berry 1990; Mooney and Lee 1995; and Roh and Berry 2008).  
Regional diffusion played the largest role out of the two external factors included in the 
study. Although most innovation and diffusion work has moved away from regional-fixed 
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models, my research suggests that in some cases, these models might best capture policy 
adoption by the states. 
  The research supports the work of other scholars, that the federal government can play a 
role in the adoption of policy on the state level (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-Markel 2004; Hoekstra 
2009). The federal policy adoption by Congress had no effect on state adoption, because the 
states did not need to act if the federal government chose to pass their preferred policy. However, 
when the Supreme Court overturned the federal RFRA, the states reacted by adopting state 
RFRAs. Future work should continue to test federal influence on state adoption and diffusion of 
policy. 
There are a few notable limitations to my study of state RFRAs. Evangelical population 
might not be the best measure of religious involvement. For instance, religious organizations 
might be a better indicator because of the increased pressure they would face from losing 
increased protections for free exercise. They might also be more aware of policies effecting 
religious people in their states.     
Another limitation is that my models do not have a way of parsing out the effect of 
LGBTQ+ interest groups on the policy debate. Future work might be able to use such a measure 
to explain more fully what might cause a state to accept or reject RFRA. Recent RFRA debates 
have seen the mobilization of big business, Hollywood, and sport organizations on behalf of 
LGBTQ+ communities. This effect might not have an impact on the religious, however, state 
politicians are certainly concerned about alienating these groups. These would be helpful 
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Conclusion: Where Do We Go from Here? 
For religious Americans, a belief in God binds them to their nation and in many ways to 
each other (Kosmin and Keysar 2006, 24). Many Christians share a belief that America is 
divinely guided (McCartney 2004; Judis 2005). This is not a new notion. As far back as the 
American Revolution, founding fathers relied on religious thought (Murrin 2007; Noll 2003). 
George Washington’s farewell address highlighted the role religion would play if the 
Constitution were to endure (see Hutson 2003). The promotion of slogans like “In God We 
Trust,” are seen as a unifying call for all citizens. 
Yet, 72 percent of Americans say that the country is divided on religious lines (Putnam 
and Campbell 2010, 516). The mixture of the Christian God with the future of the nation is not a 
welcoming one. Fears of discrimination from a state devotion to Christian faith are reasonable to 
those who are left out of that tradition of faith. For instance, it is probably the tie of Christian 
faith to national pride that led Americans to fear and dislike Muslims, even those American 
Muslims who love this country (Penning 2009). Furthermore, claims of religious belief have 
been used as a defense for government exemption from laws protecting against discrimination 
based on sexual orientation. In the United States we expect the rights of groups to be protected.  
This dissertation is unified by a focus on the role of religion in American Politics. 
Chapter two focused on Social Identity Theory, which I employed as the theoretical undergirding 
for this study (see Tajfel and Turner 1979). Tajfel and Turner (1979) suggest that groups and 
individuals are driven by a need for positive group identity. They posit that the need for positive 
identity leads to the comparison of an in-group with a relevant out-group. My analysis of data 
from nationally representative surveys suggests that religious identity plays a role in shaping 
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policy preferences. Two policies, the death penalty and military intervention in Iraq and Syria 
against militant Muslim groups, like ISIS, were used to test the hypothesis. Gun owner identity 
was also used to illustrate the influence of identities on the likelihood of support for policy. 
Evangelicals and gun owners share a mutual disdain for militant Muslims and those on death row 
(Gath 2009, p.249; Grasmick et al. 1992; Halbrook 2013; Jacobson 2005), which would perhaps 
target them as relevant out-groups.           
Findings in Chapter 2 also provide support for the arguments made by Campbell and his 
colleagues’ (2011) concerning an indirect effect hypothesis. The hypothesis states that religious 
identity alone does not lead to policy preference except for some unique cases like abortion and 
gay marriage (Campbell et al. 2011). Instead a second identity, in their case partisanship, is 
needed to activate the effects of religious belief. In my study the evidence suggests that an 
Evangelical and gun owner identity interact to increase the likelihood of supporting military 
intervention.  
Chapter three investigates the likelihood of support for a religious freedom frame. Social 
Identity Theory was again used to understand possible motivational factors for this support (See 
Tajfel and Turner 1979). Special attention was paid to Evangelicals. Religious groups are unique 
in providing “internal affective experiences” through rituals, sacred texts, and stories (Wellman 
and Tokuno 2004). These experiences are personally significant to members, thus creating strong 
attachments to the religion (Kinnvall 2004; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007).  
Evidence from Chapter three suggests three major points. First, Evangelicals are more 
likely to perceive societal discrimination against Christians. As stated above, negative group 
esteem leads to action from that group, usually in the form of conflict with a relevant out-group 
(Tajfel and Turner 1979). Therefore, we should expect Evangelicals to be more reactive to out-
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groups. One such out-group, which have been garnering more support by the public, are lesbian, 
gay, bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ+) individuals (Lax and Phillips 2009; Lewis and 
Rogers 1999; Powell et al. 2010).  
Second, Evangelicals are more likely to support the religious freedom frame. More 
specifically, I found that Evangelicals support the right of a small business owner to refuse 
service to gays and lesbians on religious grounds. This kind of support for the in-group has been 
demonstrated by social identity researchers (Tajfel and Billic 1974). Tajefel and Billic (1974) in 
their research created two groups for their participants to join. The groups were based on whether 
the participants overestimated or underestimated how many miles a car could run from a tank of 
gas. After separating participants, they found that even in arbitrarily created groups members 
favor in-group members over out-group members (Tajfel and Billic 1974).  
Thirdly, there is debate whether or not Social Identity Theory posits, or should posit, that 
groups actively seek to discriminate against relevant out-groups (see Turner and Reynold 2008). 
Evidence provided in this chapter suggests that Evangelicals are less likely to perceive 
discrimination against LGBTQ+ individuals, and are less likely to support policies that would 
protect them against discrimination. These findings, while not conclusive in solving the debate, 
indicate that groups do not only support the in-group but actively support discrimination against 
out-groups.        
Chapter Four takes a different angle from the previous chapters by focusing on state 
adoption of Religious Freedom Restoration Acts (RFRAs). RFRAs have sparked large debate in 
and outside of academia (Hamilton 1998; Laylock 1993). Hamilton (1998) outlines that state 
RFRAs are unconstitutional and decries the use of them for discriminatory purposes. Laylock 
(1993) has commented on RFRA laws to be a means of protecting religious minorities. By using 
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event history analysis on a 22-year pooled cross-sectional dataset of the American states, I 
investigate the internal and external determinants impacting the likelihood of state adoption of 
RFRA laws (Berry and Berry 1990; Walker 1969). 
My findings suggest mild support for the conclusion that Evangelical population 
influences the passage of state RFRAs, but only within regions where high adoption is already 
occurring. However, the research does support the work of other scholars, that the federal 
government can play a role in the adoption of policy on the state level (Allen, Pettus, and Haider-
Markel 2004; Hoekstra 2009). I find that the Supreme Court’s Boerne V. Flores decision lead to 
a burst of RFRA adoption in the states. My findings do not indicate the Evangelical beliefs are 
the sole driver of RFRA adoption, yet, these policies are certainly sought for in the name of 
religious beliefs.   
Some have argued that debates over religion are debates over fundamental values 
(Putnam and Campbell 2010, 493). The adage that religion should not be discussed at the dinner 
table, is proof of the volatile nature of religion. Yet, America continues to be influenced by 
religion well into the twenty-first century. Little evidence, and certainly none provided here, 
indicates that “religion is doomed” (see Stark and Finke 2000, pg. 29). 
How do we balance protecting religious liberty and preventing religion-based 
discrimination? The answers are not going to be easily found. My project indicates that religious 
groups will defend their policy preferences even while ignoring the calls of help by minority 
groups. Perhaps, as more attention is paid by the courts, the public, political elites, interest 
groups, and the like, compromise between religious liberty and anti-discrimination will be 
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